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I. Introduction
Copyright law continually struggles to keep up with
technological advances.1 A combination of the often unpredictable
pace of technological innovation, the reliably slow pace of
lawmaking, and other factors leads to a delay in the legal response
to copyright issues posed by new technology.2 These issues—
including those surrounding home video recording,3 MP3 files,4
1. See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on
Copyright, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1835–36 (2009) (“Because innovation is
rapid and unpredictable, the adaptation of copyright law lags far behind the
introduction of new technological advancements.”).
2. See id. at 1840–41 (listing as contributing factors “the creation of new
legal rules takes time . . . [,] the dynamic and unpredictable nature of
technological innovation[,] . . . the unpredictability of innovation [that]
necessitates . . . open-ended standards in copyright law[, and] . . . ambiguity as
to the potential social and economic implications of a novel technology”).
3. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984) (concluding that the private home use of Betamax recorders is a
noninfringing fair use).
4. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (determining that defendant’s website, which allowed CD
owners to obtain MP3 copies of their CDs, infringed on plaintiff record
companies’ copyrights).
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and peer-to-peer file sharing software5—are many times not
resolved either by Congress or the courts until years after these
technologies are first introduced.6
Furthermore, unlike copyright cases in general, cases
involving new technology call into question “not just the legality
of certain uses of copyrighted works, but also, quite often, the
legality of new technologies that can have a profound impact on
innovation and the growth of the U.S. economy, as well as on
people’s daily lives.”7 For example, the Supreme Court’s 1984
decision Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.8
saved the fledgling VCR industry—thereby enabling the home
video industry to make billions for the very studios that had
challenged the legality of VCRs9—but required a significant shift
in copyright fair use doctrine to do so.10 With the advent of new
technologies, copyright law not only must attempt to keep pace
but must do so in a way that accounts for its impact on the
technology at issue, industry, and daily life.11

5. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
936–37 (2005) (holding “that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties”).
6. See Depoorter, supra note 1, at 1843 (providing a table that lists
technologies, the year they were introduced, the congressional or court action
that resolved corresponding copyright issues, and the difference in years
between the introduction of the technology and the year of the legal action).
7. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 797 (2010).
8. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
9. See Lee, supra note 7, at 797 (describing how instead of dooming
Hollywood studios, the VCR “facilitated the growth of a vast new and
unforeseen market for the movie studios in the rental and sale of videos for
home viewing, which, perhaps ironically, became ‘the largest source of revenue
for the [U.S.] movie industry’” (alteration in original) (quoting Edward Lee, The
Ethics of Innovation: P2P Software Developers and Designing Substantial
Noninfringing Uses Under the Sony Doctrine, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 148
(2005))).
10. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (determining that the issue was whether
“Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”).
11. See Depoorter, supra note 1, at 1842 (describing how until the effects of
the new technology on the market are known, “both copyright owners and users
of new technologies operate in a vacuum of considerable legal uncertainty”).
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Three-dimensional (3D) printing has been called the next
disruptive technology to conflict with copyright law.12 This
technology, which allows people in their own homes to reproduce
any 3D object, “eventually promises to democratize creation.”13
Although 3D printing is now generally the province of industry14
and hobbyists,15 it is only a matter of time before it becomes
ubiquitous, given that 3D printer prices continue to fall.16 And
while no one has filed a lawsuit yet,17 parties have fired opening
salvos. Copyright holders have issued takedown notices per the
12. See Peter Hanna, The Next Napster? Copyright Questions as 3D
Printing Comes of Age, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 6, 2011, 12:35 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/04/the-next-napster-copyright-questionsas-3d-printing-comes-of-age/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“Though still in its
infancy, personal 3D printing technology already shows the same disruptive
potential as the original printing press. . . . And it’s precisely because of its
potential as a game changer that 3D printing presents challenging legal
questions best addressed before the technology becomes ubiquitous.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Id.
14. See Chris Morrison, What Works: 3-D Printing for the Rest of Us,
CNNMONEY (Aug. 22, 2007, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/
08/21/technology/3d_printing.biz2/index.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014)
(explaining how companies such as Logitech and Boeing use 3D printers to
quickly create testable prototypes and how manufacturers use 3D printers to
create spare parts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“3D printing today remains a hobbyistdriven enterprise with a high barrier to entry.”).
16. See HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D
PRINTING 39 (2013) (explaining that when someone develops a “killer app”—
Facebook, Angry Birds, etc.—consumers will be compelled to purchase 3D
printers). Compare Morrison, supra note 14 (noting that 3D printers in 1997
were used almost exclusively by major manufacturing companies for prototypes
and cost $120,000, while by 2007, similar machines cost $50,000), with Andy
Greenberg, Inside Thingiverse, the Radically Open Website Powering the 3D
Printing Movement, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/andygreenberg/2012/11/21/inside-thingiverse-the-radically-open-websitepowering-the-3d-printing-movement/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“In September
the Brooklyn, N.Y. firm Makerbot started selling the $2,200 Replicator 2, its
latest and most polished 3-D printer . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
17. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (“The site has already had to remove
several designs after receiving takedown notices under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. . . . Thingiverse has yet to face an intellectual property lawsuit
over the infringing content its users upload, like the $1 billion tort that Viacom
threw at Google’s YouTube service in 2007.”).
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act18 (DMCA) to websites that
allow users to download 3D computer-aided design (CAD) files.19
Moreover, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently issued
a patent for a 3D printing digital rights management method,
similar to those used by Apple and by Barnes & Noble’s Nook,
which would prevent 3D printers from using pirated CAD files.20
As 3D printing becomes more widespread, however, copyright
owners who until now have looked the other way will be more
likely to take action.21 3D printing will either exploit a sufficient
portion of the market,22 or it will affect the works of specific
copyright owners who will take exception to the 3D printing of
their works.23
3D printing will pose a number of novel challenges for courts
in copyright cases. First, as individual authors and companies try
to claim copyright over CAD files, “[t]he line between a physical
object and a digital description of a physical object may . . . begin
to blur. With a 3D printer, having the bits [will be] almost as
good as having the atoms.”24 In addition, there are numerous
18. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05, 1301–32
(2012).
19. See infra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (explaining what CAD
files are and how they work).
20. See Antonio Regalado, Nathan Myhrvold’s Cunning Plan to Prevent 3-D
Printer Piracy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.
com/view/429566/nathan-myhrvolds-cunning-plan-to-prevent-3-d-printer-piracy/
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“The patent basically covers the idea of digital rights
management, or DRM, for 3-D printers. Like with e-books that won’t open
unless you pay Barnes & Noble and use its Nook reader, with Myhrvold’s
technology your printer wouldn’t print unless you’ve paid up.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“If the current 3D printing free-for-all
sounds too good to last, it is. The community today is small and has avoided,
either by chance or design, stepping on any really big toes . . . .”).
22. See id. (comparing 3D printing to home video recording before Sony
introduced Betamax, which studios feared would cut into their home video and
box office profits).
23. See id. (comparing 3D printing to Napster before Metallica complained
about one of its demos surfacing on the p2p site).
24. Michael Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome if They Don’t Screw It Up: 3D
Printing, Intellectual Property, and the Fight over the Next Great Disruptive
Technology, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 2010), http://publicknowledge.org/it-will-beawesome-if-they-dont-screw-it-up (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter
Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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relationships to consider between copyrighted works, CAD files,
and 3D-printed objects.25 For example, an individual can create a
CAD file of an entirely original design or a design that is
potentially protected by a copyright on an existing work.26
Although sometimes independent designers create CAD files of
existing works,27 in other cases, the copyright owner or a licensee
creates the CAD file.28 The result is a complex web of
relationships between works. The copyrightability of a CAD file
might depend on whether the object depicted was copyrightable.29
Review); see also LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 23 (“Scanning technology
and 3D printing will together introduce high resolution shapeshifting between
the physical and digital worlds.”). Lipson and Kurman also highlight that sales
revenue for mid- and small-sized non-industrial 3D printers increased 40%
between 2010 and 2011. Id. at 40. But see id. at 39–40 (quoting analyst Terry
Wohlers as speculating that consumers will rely on services such as Shapeways
or Amazon instead of purchasing their own printers).
25. See Michael Weinberg, What’s the Deal with Copyright and 3D
Printing?, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 8 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.publicknowledge.
org/files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright_%20Final%20version2.p
df [hereinafter Weinberg, What’s the Deal?] (“However, as the Penrose triangle
story suggests, the intersection of 3D printing and copyright is often not a clean
one, and the situation tends to get complicated quickly.”). The “Penrose triangle
story” refers to the story of Dr. Ulrich Schwanitz, who posted a CAD file of a
well-known optical illusion online. Id. at 6–7. Thingiverse users subsequently
posted similar files, which were presumably downloaded and printed. Id.
26. Compare The Wired 3D Print-off, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/
design/2013/01/3-d-print-off/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (publishing examples of
“original, printable” designs for a contest such as “a heart [pendant] created by
365 smaller hearts,” “a three legged robot with a mini cannon,” and “a
Christmas ornament of a snowflake trapped within an intricate hollow star
cage”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), with Greenberg,
supra note 16 (“[T]he site turns up plenty of potentially trademarked or
copyrighted designs, like an Iron Man helmet or figurines from Star Wars and
the videogame Doom.”).
27. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (implying that the designers of CAD files
depicting Iron Man or Star Wars characters did not have the copyright owners’
permission to create the files).
28. See Mike Senese, Nokia Releases Files for 3-D Printing Your Own
Phone Case, WIRED (Jan. 18, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/
2013/01/nokia-3d-print-case/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“Nokia has opened its
arms to 3-D printing with the release of printable design files and instructions
for making your own Nokia phone case.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
29. See Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 7 (“Although the
story ends well, there is a gaping hole at the center of it: the entire narrative
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The outcomes of derivative works and fair use issues might
depend on whether the potentially infringing work is a CAD file
or a 3D-printed object, or whether the protected work is a CAD
file or a preexisting copyrighted object. Courts will have to sort
through these ancillary matters in order to determine the
outcomes of infringement actions.
This Note seeks to untangle the component issues of the
network of relationships unique to 3D printing. First, it addresses
whether CAD files, insofar as they contain both design drawing
and computer code elements and exist for the distinct purpose of
3D printing, are copyrightable. Second, in light of the issue of
copyrightability, it examines whether CAD files and 3D-printed
objects are independently copyrightable as derivative works, and
whether they infringe on authors’ derivative works rights.
Finally, it questions whether current fair use doctrine, as an
affirmative defense for otherwise infringing works, can
adequately account for 3D printing as an emerging technology.
After explaining how 3D printing and CAD files work in Part
II, this Note provides the legal background for copyrightability,
derivative works, and fair use in Parts III, IV, and V,
respectively. In Part VI.A, this Note explains why CAD files fail
to fit within any current category of copyrightable works. As a
solution, it poses a new test that considers a CAD file’s drawing
and code components separately before determining whether
otherwise copyrightable expression has merged with the CAD
file’s functional purpose. With this test in mind, Part VI.B
examines the derivative works issues. Finally, in Part VI.C, this
Note argues that the established fair use doctrine will fail to
provide predictable outcomes in 3D printing cases that are
consistent with the goals of fair use and copyright generally.
Rather, 3D printing poses unique challenges that demonstrate
the need to adopt Professor Edward Lee’s technological fair use
standard as a separate test that can account for the potential
benefits of and harm to emerging technologies.

assumes that Schwanitz has a copyright in his design that was copied in the
first place.”).
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II. An Explanation of 3D Printing and CAD Files
To examine the copyright issues pertaining to 3D printing,
one must first understand 3D printers, CAD files, and the
relationship between the two. 3D printers operate in a similar
manner to inkjet printers except that, instead of printing on a
two-dimensional piece of paper, 3D printers build up a 3D object
by printing tiny layers of plastic, metal, ceramics, or other
materials on top of each other.30 These printers are capable of
producing—among other things—machine parts,31 architectural
models,32 board games,33 and even (when cellular material is used
in the printer) human tissue.34 Assuming that the 3D printer is
large enough, it can print objects of any size.35

30. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 68, 73 (describing two types of
3D printers: those that “squirt, squeeze, or spray” materials (most consumer
models); and those that use lasers to “fuse, bind, or glue” powdered materials
together); id. at 82 (“[M]ost companies and printing hobbyists must content
themselves with plastic, metals, ceramics, edible semi-solid foodstuffs, and to a
lesser extent concrete or glass.”); Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24
(“Instead of taking a block of material and cutting away until it produces a solid
object, a 3D printer actually builds the object up from tiny bits of material, layer
by layer.”).
31. See Morrison, supra note 14 (“[H]e pulls out a perfectly turned machine
part—a plastic housing that slides neatly into place . . . .”).
32. See id. (discussing how one family business “toyed with several ideas—
jewelry making, medical printing—before settling on architectural modeling”).
33. See Joseph Flaherty, Watch Your Back, Hasbro, 3-D Printed Games
Have Arrived, WIRED (Aug. 30, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/
design/2012/08/watch-your-back-hasbro-3d-printed-games-have-arrived/
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“3D printers are sometimes called Santa Claus machines
because, like Santa, they can create anything imaginable. . . . The team at Ill
Gotten Games is doing just that by creating Pocket Tactics, the first open source
miniatures game designed to be manufactured on a 3D printer.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See Biological Tissues from a Printer, GEN NEWS HIGHLIGHTS (Sept. 14,
2012), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/biological-tissues-froma-printer/81247319/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“[T]he new technique . . .
effectively allows complex nanostructures such as blood vessels or potentially
new heart tissue, for example, to be printed out of biocompatible materials in
just seconds.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“The size of these shapes is only limited by
the size of the printer making them.”).
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3D printers operate from virtual 3D models called CAD
files.36 CAD files are saved in .amf format37 or the older and more
widely used .stl format—“the object equivalent of a .pdf file—they
are more or less universally printable by 3D printers and allow
objects to be transferred digitally around the world.”38 The files
are either rendered by a designer on a computer software
program or created using a 3D scanner.39 “Much as a word
processor is superior to a typewriter because it allows a writer to
add, delete, and edit text freely, a CAD program [as opposed to a
physical prototype] allows a designer to manipulate a design as
she sees fit.”40 There are two types of design software. First, “solid
modeling” software offers users a library of ready-made shapes
“that can be cut stretched, and combined with a few clicks of a
mouse.”41 Second, “surface modeling” software allows users to
construct 3D objects freehand by “digitally ‘wrapping’ shapes in a
virtual fishing net” to map the objects in space.42 On the other
hand, 3D scanners “capture physical dimensions of things . . . as
36. See Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 (explaining how CAD
files work).
37. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 101–02 (describing .amf files
as a “new XML-based standard”).
38. Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 14. Lipson and Kurman
argue that the .stl format cannot handle the volume of information in modern
CAD files, but that until 3D-printing vendors adopt the .amf format, “we’re
stuck . . . [with] the old but tired warhorse STL.” LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note
16, at 102.
39. See Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 (“3D printing starts
with a blueprint, usually one created with a computer aided design (CAD)
program running on a desktop computer. This is a virtual 3D model of an
object. . . . A designer uses the CAD program to create the model, which is then
saved as a file.”); As 3-D Printing Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions
Arise, KUNC 91.5 (Feb. 19, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://www.kunc.org/post/3-dprinting-becomes-more-accessible-copyright-questions-arise (last visited Jan. 31,
2014) (describing how companies have created software that turns the Kinect
for Microsoft’s Xbox 360 into a 3D scanner capable of “collect[ing] 3-D data and
images, and . . . stitch[ing] everything together into a detailed 3-D model”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24.
41. LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 92. “Solid modeling was born from
industrial design and manufacturing.” Id. at 93.
42. Id. at 94. “If solid modeling grew up among engineers, surface modeling
design software grew up in the midst of animators and illustrators.” Id.
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a surface coating of digital confetti [in which e]ach piece of digital
confetti represents a data point . . . documented as a set of x, y,
and z coordinates.”43
To print a 3D object, the CAD software “deconstructs the
image into a series of 2D cross-sectional slices”44 and sends them
through computer code to the 3D printer.45 The printer then
deposits the material layer by layer.46 Software that is available
on the Internet enables individuals with any level of CAD
modeling experience to create their own designs, with some
programs including a variety of drawing tools and others
supplying a library of premade shapes.47
Websites make CAD files available to the public for
download.48 Some such sites charge users to download files.49
Others, however, allow “users to freely upload, improve upon, and
distribute virtually any designs at all.”50 The website
Thingiverse, for example, makes 25,000 CAD files available for
free.51 These files often depict copyrighted works, whether they
are “distinctive designer items” or Darth Vader heads.52 As a step
43. Id. at 96.
44. Hanna, supra note 12.
45. See Thomas Olson, Technology Takes Printing to Whole Different
Dimension, PITT. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2013, 9:23 PM), http://triblive.com/news/
adminpage/3265615-74/printing-greene-pittsburgh#axzz2JhO6mvSH
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“The 3-D printing process starts with a computer file of
code that describes an object’s dimensions and properties.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For examples of .stl file code, see The STL
Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, FABBER.COM, http://www.
ennex.com/~fabbers/StL.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“The printer deposits layers of material,
typically plastic or metal, one atop the other in the shape of each 2D slice.”).
47. See The Wired 3D Print-Off, supra note 26 (providing links to CAD
modeling software and sites including Tinkercad, Shapeways Creator, Autodesk
123D Design, and Sketchup).
48. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“Two models have emerged for websites that
distribute and/or fabricate 3D designs.”).
49. See id. (describing the “money model” typified by Shapeways).
50. Id. (describing the “open model” typified by Thingiverse).
51. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (“Anyone who buys a Makerbot can
immediately download and print any of Thingiverse’s 25,000 designs.”).
52. See Hanna, supra note 12 (discussing the types of items for which CAD
files are available on Shapeways and Thingiverse, respectively).
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to prevent future lawsuits after receiving its first DMCA
takedown notice,53 Thingiverse posted online its Intellectual
Property Policy, which “provides for the removal of any infringing
or unauthorized materials and for the termination, in appropriate
circumstances, of users of our online Site and Services who are
repeat infringers of intellectual property rights or who repeatedly
submit unauthorized content.”54 But while websites such as
Thingiverse may attempt to limit their liability,55 copyright suits
almost inevitably loom in the near future for these sites,
individual CAD designers, and users of 3D printers.56

53. See Brian Rideout, Note, Printing the Impossible Triangle: The
Copyright Implications of Three-Dimensional Printing, 5 J. BUS.,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 161, 165–66 (2011) (recounting the first DMCA
takedown notice for 3D printing in February 2011, which Ulrich Schwanitz
issued when another designer posted a CAD file of his Penrose Triangle model
on the open website, Thingiverse).
54. Intellectual Property Policy, THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.
com/legal/ip-policy (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Thingiverse Blog, Copyright Policy, THINGIVERSE (Feb.
18, 2011), http://blog.thingiverse.com/2011/02/18/copyright-and-intellectual-prop
erty-policy/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (explaining that on the day after
Schwanitz issued his takedown notice, Thingiverse “updated [its] legal page
with a new DMCA specific policy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Thingiverse’s Terms of Use also require a user to select either a
“Creative Commons License” or an “All Rights Reserved” license for any content
that she uploads onto the site. Terms of Use, THINGIVERSE,
http://www.thingiverse.com/legal (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, the user agrees “not to use the
Site or Services to collect, upload, transmit, display, or distribute any User
Content . . . that violates any third-party right, including any copyright,
trademark, patent, trade secret, moral right, privacy right, right of publicity, or
any other intellectual property or proprietary right.” Id.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing safe harbor from
contributory infringement for websites that do not “have actual knowledge that
the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing” and “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or disable access to, the material”).
56. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (explaining how it is only
a matter of time before a copyright holder commences an action related to 3D
printing).
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III. Legal Requirements of and Limitations on Copyrightability
The Supreme Court has asserted that “[t]o establish
[copyright] infringement, two elements must be proven:
(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.”57 Thus, in any
infringement case concerning 3D printing or otherwise, courts
will first have to determine whether the plaintiff owns a valid
copyright. This Part explains the legal requirements of and
limitations on copyrightability.
A. Original Works Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 197658 defines
copyrightable subject matter. Under this section, copyright
protection extends to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”59 Copyrightability can therefore be broken into two
components: a work must be “original” and “fixed in any tangible
medium.”60
1. Originality
Originality consists of “independent creation” and a
“modicum of creativity.”61 Independent creation does not require
novelty, and “a work may be original even though it closely
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not
the result of copying.”62 In other words, if two authors
independently—and ignorant of each other—created the exact
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Id.
Id.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
Id. at 345.
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same work, both would satisfy the originality requirement.63
When compared to a previously existing work, the work in
question is original if “the ‘author’ contributed something more
than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his
own.’”64 The creativity requirement is a similarly low threshold.65
Almost any work possesses “some creative spark ‘no matter how
crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”66 Some works, such as
those containing mere facts, however, fail the creativity prong.67
2. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression
Works must not only be original to be copyrightable; they
must also be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.68
Although the Constitution authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings,”69 courts have historically interpreted
“writings” broadly.70 As noted above, Congress has since codified
the courts’ approach, extending protection to works “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”71 As a nonexaustive list of
63. See id. at 345–46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant
of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are
original and, hence, copyrightable.” (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936))).
64. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951).
65. See id. (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice.”).
66. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1 M.
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 201(A), (B) (1990)).
67. See id. at 347 (explaining that facts “do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship” and are therefore unoriginal discoveries rather than creations).
68. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (stating the § 102(a)
requirement).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (explaining how
courts have interpreted the term “writings . . . to include any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor” (citing Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879))), superseded by statute on other grounds, Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101–805 (2012)).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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examples,72 the statute specifically declares copyright-eligible
“(1) literary
works;
(2) musical
works,
including
any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.”73
B. Limits on Copyrightability
Although § 102(a) sets a relatively low originality threshold
for copyrightability,74 the Copyright Act does provide limits on
what is protected. Under § 102(b), copyright protection does not
extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.”75 Just as courts have had to separate
noncopyrightable facts from the potentially copyrightable
compilation of those facts,76 so too have courts struggled with the
idea–expression
dichotomy—the
difference
between
noncopyrightable ideas and the expression of those ideas.77
Furthermore, copyrightability, insofar as it protects expression,
does not extend to useful articles—or the functional aspects—of a
work.78
72. See id. (“Works of authorship include the following categories . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
73. Id.
74. See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining that the “independent creation” and
“modicum of creativity” requirements for originality are easily met).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
76. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 344–51 (1991)
(discussing how compilations of facts, rather than the facts themselves, can be
copyrightable when “choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are
made independently by the compiler[,] . . . entail a minimal degree of
creativity”).
77. See id. at 349–50 (“To this end, copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas
and information conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the
idea/expression . . . dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.”).
78. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143
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1. The Idea–Expression Dichotomy and Merger

The basis for the idea–expression dichotomy comes from
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that “[i]n no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”79
Thus, “[u]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to
the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea—not the idea itself.”80 The Supreme Court first articulated
the concept of the idea–expression dichotomy in Baker v.
Selden,81 stating that
[T]here is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and
the art which it is intended to illustrate. The mere statement
of the proposition is so evident, that it requires hardly any
argument to support it. The same distinction may be
predicated of every other art as well as that of book-keeping. A
treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old
or new; on the construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or
churns; or on the mixture and application of colors for painting
or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect
of perspective,—would be the subject of copyright; but no one
would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the
exclusive right to the art or manufacture described therein.82

(2d Cir. 1987) (explaining how Congress attempted to draw a clear line between
copyrightable pictorial and sculptural works, on the one hand, and
noncopyrightable elements of design, on the other).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
80. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), superseded on other grounds
by federal regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959).
81. 101 U.S. 99 (1880). In Baker, the plaintiff published a book describing
an accounting system that he had invented. Id. at 99–100. When the defendant
used the plaintiff’s system without his permission, the plaintiff sued for
copyright infringement. Id. at 100. As the Court noted, “[i]f the complainant’s
testator had the exclusive right to the use of the system explained in his book, it
would be difficult to contend that the defendant does not infringe it.” Id. But,
the Court explained, the plaintiff’s copyright lay in the book only as an
explanatory work; he could not claim copyright over the system itself. See id.
(“[I]t seems to be equally difficult to contend that the books made and sold by
the defendant are a violation of the copyright of the complainant’s book
considered merely as a book explanatory of the system.”).
82. Id. at 102.
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For the Court, the distinction between idea and expression
marked the line between patent and copyright.83 The question of
ownership of an idea hinged on novelty—a patent concept—
whereas an author’s book was copyrightable even if it described
an idea thousands of years old.84 Thus, “expression” in this
context can be better understood as the means of expression.85
The idea–expression dichotomy presents a number of
problems, including the doctrine of merger. The doctrine of
merger states that “[w]hen there is essentially only one way to
express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and
copyright is no bar to copying that expression.”86 When the
expression becomes essential to the idea itself, the two effectively
“merge,” rendering the expression noncopyrightable.87 Thus, as
the Supreme Court noted in Baker, copyright protection extends
only to those expressions that are not “necessary incidents” to the
idea.88
For example, in the context of computer software, a number
of concerns can limit an author’s choices of expression until only a
single means of expression is possible.89 Software copyrights,
83. See id. (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the
art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially
made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of
letters-patent, not of copyright.”).
84. See id. (“The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other works,
would be valid without regard to the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subjectmatter. The novelty of the art or thing described or explained has nothing to do
with the validity of the copyright.”).
85. See Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1995) (“In particular, a copyright owner may not lay claim
to the ideas within her work, but only to her particular means of expressing
those ideas.”).
86. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606
(1st Cir. 1988).
87. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir.
1992) (“Under these circumstances, the expression is said to have ‘merged’ with
the idea itself. In order not to confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright
owner, such expression should not be protected.”).
88. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).
89. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 709–10 (“[A] programmer’s freedom of design
choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as . . .
(1) mechanical
specifications
of
the
computer . . . ;
(2) compatibility
requirements of other programs . . . ; (3) computer manufacturers’ design

608

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014)

which serve a largely utilitarian function, face specific problems
because almost all “expression” in the code or structure of the
program is incidental to the purpose of the program.90 In an
attempt to formulate a bright-line rule to account for the idea–
expression dichotomy, the Third Circuit determined in Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.91 that “the
purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of the idea.”92 Under
Whelan, then, anything that survives a merger inquiry is
copyrightable expression.93 Later decisions, however, determined
that lack of merger alone is not sufficient to constitute
copyrightability. Rather, courts must also account for whether
elements were dictated by external factors,94 and they must
determine whether certain aspects were noncopyrightable
under § 102(b).95

standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) . . . programming
practices within the computer industry.”).
90. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 7 (“[C]omputer programs are written for
a utilitarian purpose. Expression in the code or structure and organization of a
program is normally only incidental to that purpose.”).
91. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 1236 (emphasis omitted).
93. See id. (“Where there are various means of achieving the desired
purpose, then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose;
hence, there is expression, not idea.”).
94. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d
Cir. 1992) (employing an “abstraction–filtration–comparison” test in which the
court, during the filtration step, determines whether any of the potentially
infringed expression is necessitated by efficiency (essentially a merger inquiry),
necessitated by external elements such as constraints on hardware, or taken
from the public domain).
95. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir. 1995)
(determining that the court need not apply the Altai test if the menu tree at
issue was a noncopyrightable method of operation from the start).

CAD’S CRADLE

609
2. The Useful Article Doctrine

Another limitation on copyrightability that has posed
problems for the courts is the useful article doctrine. The doctrine
essentially states that
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work [which is copyright-eligible under
§ 102(a)] only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.96

While pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as defined by
§ 10197 are eligible for copyright protection under § 102(a),98 any
mechanical or utilitarian aspects of the work are not.99 Section
101 defines “useful article” as an “article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information.”100 The useful article
doctrine seeks to draw a line between copyrightable works of art
and noncopyrightable works of industrial design.101 Although the
useful article doctrine is like the idea–expression dichotomy in its
attempt to create a boundary between copyrightable and
noncopyrightable subject matter, the idea–expression dichotomy
applies to all works of authorship,102 while the useful article
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
97. See id. (“‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include twodimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”).
98. See id. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works . . . .”).
99. See id. § 101 (“Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned.”).
100. Id.
101. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“In adopting this amendatory
language, the Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible between
copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial
design.”).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (providing that an idea is not
copyrightable “regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied”).
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doctrine applies only to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works.103 Furthermore, because expression survives the doctrine
of merger if it is not incidental to the idea that it expresses,104
certain copyrightable elements of an article can survive the
useful article doctrine.105
The challenge for the courts has been to devise a standard by
which copyrightable elements can be separated from useful
articles.106 Courts have drawn on language in the legislative
history of the Copyright Act of 1976 to develop two theories of
separability: physical separability and conceptual separability.107
For an element to be physically separable it must be “capable of
existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article
into which [it was] incorporated.”108 It must be “a ‘feature’
segregable from the overall shape” of the useful article.109 On the
other hand, conceptual separability requires that elements,
regardless of whether they possess aesthetic features, can be
“conceptualized as existing independently of their utilitarian
function.”110 Courts, however, have struggled to determine what
constitutes a conception of independent existence.111
Three distinct tests have emerged for determining whether
features of a work are conceptually separable from the useful

103. See id. § 101 (defining “useful article” in terms of pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works).
104. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing how expression
not incidental to the idea is copyrightable).
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“[O]nly elements, if any, which
can be identified separately from the useful article as such are copyrightable.”).
106. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1142
(2d Cir. 1987) (“The courts, however, have had difficulty framing tests by which
the fine line establishing what is and what is not copyrightable can be drawn.”).
107. See id. at 1143 (“One aspect of the distinction that has drawn
considerable attention is the reference in the House Report to ‘physically or
conceptually’ . . . separable elements.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55
(1976))).
108. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
109. Id. at 805.
110. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir.
1985).
111. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1144 (“The problem, however, is determining
exactly what it is and how it is to be applied.”).
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article.112 First, Judge Newman’s dissent in Carol Barnhart, Inc.
v. Economy Cover Corp.113 proposed a “temporal displacement
test” for conceptual separability.114 Under the temporal
displacement test, which William Patry supports in his
treatise,115 an artistic element is separable from the useful article
if “the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two
different concepts that are not inevitably entertained
simultaneously.”116 Rather than merely evoking in the observer a
concept separate from utilitarian function,117 the “design [must]
112. See id. at 1144–45 (considering Judge Newman’s “temporal
displacement test” from Barnhart and Professor Denicola’s test); 1 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3.1 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT] (providing a third test dependent on traditional
conceptions of art). Professor Goldstein actually identifies five tests for
conceptual separability besides his own, but considers the tests “overlapping.”
Id. By narrowing the list to three, this Note touches on those tests that consider
distinct criteria.
113. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). Barnhart concerned the copyrightability of
torso mannequins. Id. at 412. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that
the mannequins were useful articles, and that artistic elements could not be
physically or conceptually separated. Id. at 419. While the majority relied
almost entirely on legislative history, however, to settle the question of
conceptual separability, Judge Newman’s dissent advocated for a new temporal
displacement test. See id. at 418 (“The legislative history thus confirms that,
while copyright protection has increasingly been extended to cover articles
having a utilitarian dimension, Congress has explicitly refused copyright
protection for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or
artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the useful article.”);
id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“I think the requisite ‘separateness’ exists
whenever the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two different
concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”).
114. See id. at 422–24 (explaining the test); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987) (referring to the test as the
“temporal displacement” test).
115. See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:141 (2006) (preferring
the temporal displacement test to the Denicola test from Brandir).
116. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422.
117. See id. at 423 (“Some might think that the requisite separability of
concepts exists whenever the design of a form engenders in the mind of the
ordinary observer any concept that is distinct from the concept of the form’s
utilitarian function.”). Such an understanding of conceptual separability would
allow for copyrightability of merely aesthetically pleasing articles—protection
that Congress specifically intended not to extend. See id. (“That approach, I fear,
would subvert the Congressional effort to deny copyright protection to designs of
useful articles that are aesthetically pleasing.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55
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engender[] a non-utilitarian concept without at the same time
engendering the concept of a utilitarian function.”118
The majority in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber Co.119 rejected the temporal displacement test in favor of
a standard that Professor Denicola articulated in Applied Art and
Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful
Articles.120 Professor Denicola suggested that there is not a bright
line between creative works and useful articles, but rather “a
spectrum of forms and shapes responsive in varying degrees to
utilitarian concerns.”121 The Brandir court interpreted Professor
Denicola’s test to mean that “if design elements reflect a merger
of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability
exists.”122
Finally, in Goldstein on Copyright, Professor Paul Goldstein
presents a test that incorporates traditional notions of art and a
concept similar to the physical separability test from Esquire, Inc.
v. Ringer.123 Professor Goldstein’s test posits that a useful article
(1976) (“On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s intention is not to offer it
copyright protection under the bill.”).
118. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 423 (2d Cir.
1985) (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
119. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). Brandir concerned the copyrightability of
the now common “RIBBON Rack” bicycle rack, which David Levine based on his
wire sculptures “formed from one continuous undulating piece of wire.” Id. at
1146. The court adopted Professor Denicola’s test and determined that the rack
was sufficiently influenced by utilitarian concerns to be not conceptually
separable, and therefore not copyrightable. Id. at 1146–47.
120. See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested
Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741–47 (1983)
(expressing dissatisfaction with Mazer and Esquire and establishing a more
flexible test).
121. Id. at 741.
122. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
123. Compare Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(explaining that for an element to be physically separable it must be “capable of
existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article into which they
were incorporated”), with GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 112, § 2.5.3.1
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is conceptually separable “if it can stand on its own as a work of
art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is
embodied would be equally useful without it.”124 Essentially, the
Goldstein test is a reformulation of the physical separability test,
except that the act of separation becomes a mental exercise
instead of an inquiry into whether the artistic and functional
elements can literally be pulled apart.125
While the statutory requirements of originality and fixation
are not particularly stringent,126 the limitations posed by the
idea–expression dichotomy and the useful article doctrine help to
draw a clearer line between copyrightable and noncopyrightable
subject matter. Copyrightability issues pertaining to 3D printing
must therefore focus on both the originality and fixation
requirements and these limitations.127
IV. Derivative Works
Once the issue of copyrightability is settled, the issue of
derivative works arises. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of
1976 gives the author of a copyrighted work “exclusive rights . . .
to prepare derivative works.”128 In terms of 3D printing, it will be
necessary to determine whether 3D-printed objects are derivative
(requiring a feature to be able to “stand on its own as work of art traditionally
conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally
useful without it”).
124. GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 112, § 2.5.3.1.
125. Compare id. (arguing that a useful article is conceptually separable if it
“can stand on its own as a work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful
article in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it” (emphasis
added)), with id. (“[A] useful article is physically separable from the article and
is thus protectable if it can be physically separated from the article without
impairing the article’s utility and if, once separated, it can stand alone as a work
of art traditionally conceived.” (emphasis added)).
126. See supra notes 61–73 (explaining the low thresholds for independent
creation and modicum of creativity for the originality requirement and how a
work can be fixed in any tangible medium).
127. See infra Part VI.A.2 (discussing the copyrightability of CAD files both
in terms of the originality and fixation requirements and the limitations of the
idea–expression dichotomy and the useful article doctrine).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
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works of the CAD files from which they were printed if the CAD
files themselves are copyrightable. Even if they are not
copyrightable,
CAD
files
that
depict
already-existing
copyrightable objects could be derivative works of the preexisting
objects. To conduct this analysis, however, one must know what
constitutes a derivative work and what exactly it means to have
the exclusive rights to prepare derivative works.
A. What Works Are “Derivative”?
Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative
work as a “work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”129 A
derivative work must therefore be (1) a transformation, recasting,
or adaptation of (2) a preexisting work.
To qualify as a derivative work, a work must transform,
adapt, or recast a preexisting work.130 Transformativeness, in the
context of derivative works, is a change in content, rather than a
change in the purpose of the work.131 The listed examples of
derivative works in § 101 of the Copyright Act suggest as much,
focusing on content-based changes such as “translation,”132
“motion picture version,”133 and “abridgment,”134 rather than a
change in purpose, such as parody.135 Examples in case law of
129. Id. § 101.
130. See id. (defining “derivative work” under the Copyright Act).
131. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work
Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008) (comparing the
transformativeness requirement for derivative works, which focuses on change
in content, with the transformativeness requirement for fair use, which focuses
on the purposes of the copyrighted work and the potentially infringing work).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(determining that parody is transformative for purposes of fair use); Reese,
supra note 131, at 486–94 (determining that a transformation in purpose is
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transformative content constituting derivative works include the
transformation of a magazine cover photograph into a computer
animation136 and user-created video game levels.137
For a derivative work to be transformative, however, there
must be a preexisting work off of which it is based.138 The
preexisting work must be copyrightable itself.139 Although this is
not mentioned expressly in the Copyright Act, the requirement
that the preexisting work be copyrightable prevents the
protection of derivative works from extending to subject matter
outside the realm of copyright law.140 Furthermore, a new work
will be “based on”141 a preexisting work, and therefore will be a
derivative work, only if the two are substantially related so that

necessary for fair use, and that a mere transformation of content is not
sufficient). For further discussion of the transformativeness requirement of fair
use, see infra notes 176–82 and accompanying text.
136. See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir.
2001) (concluding that the defendant’s computer animation of plaintiff’s
photograph of a diver violated the plaintiff’s right to prepare derivative works).
137. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that user-created levels for the Duke Nukem 3D video game were
effectively sequels, and therefore derivative works). Professor Reese notes that
Micro Star expressly mentions transformativeness only once, in a footnote, in
which the court stated that the levels were not transformative. See Reese, supra
note 131, at 474 (“In reviewing Micro Star’s fair use claim, however, the court
discussed transformativeness only in a single footnote, in which it concluded,
with no further analysis, that the additional game levels ‘can hardly be
described as transformative; anything but.’” (quoting Micro Star, 154 F.3d at
1113 n.6)). But the court was using “transformative” in the fair use,
transformative-purpose sense (Micro Star also considers the issue of fair use).
See id. (“[I]n discussing the transformativeness of Micro Star’s use, it never even
adverted to the transformation of the underlying work involved in preparing the
derivatives.”).
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that a derivative work is “based
upon one or more preexisting works” (emphasis added)).
139. See Ets-Hoken v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Under the Copyright Act, a work is not a ‘derivative work’ unless it is ‘based
upon one or more preexisting works’ and, in order to qualify as a ‘preexisting
work,’ the underlying work must be copyrightable.”).
140. See id. at 1079 (“[T]he fact that the term ‘derivative work’ appears only
in the Copyright Act, and not, for example, in the patent or trademark statutes,
indicate[s] that for a work to qualify as a derivative work, the work from which
it derives must itself be within the ambit of copyright.”).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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the new work would otherwise be infringing on the copyright of
the preexisting work.142
B. Rights Associated with Derivative Works
Derivative works can qualify for copyright protection in two
ways. First, a derivative work that otherwise meets the § 102
copyrightability criteria can qualify for independent copyright
protection.143 The originality requirement for derivative works is
the same as that for copyrightability generally.144 Thus, to be
independently copyrightable as a derivative work, the new work
must have been created independently and must possess a
modicum of creativity.145 Second, the possibility of independent
copyrightability notwithstanding, § 106(2) of the Copyright Act of
1976 grants authors of copyrighted works “exclusive rights to . . .
prepare derivative works.”146 In this way, the author of an
original work has the opportunity to capitalize on her copyright
for use of the work beyond its immediate scope.147 When someone
142. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (2012)
(explaining that a derivative work is “based on” the underlying work “only if
[the new work] would be considered an infringing work if the material which it
has derived from a preexisting work had been taken without the consent of a
copyright proprietor of such preexisting work”). The new work must be
“substantially similar in both ideas and expression.” Micro Star v. FormGen
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998). Idea is embodied in the “objective
details of the works,” while expression focuses on the “total concept and feel of
the works.” Id.
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright as
specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works . . . .”); see
also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.
1992) (implying that derivative works are themselves copyrightable if they meet
the criteria of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
144. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1266
n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In . . . examining the elements that are original to the
author, the originality analysis ought to be the same.”).
145. See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text (identifying independent
creation and a modicum of creativity as necessary components of originality and
further explaining each component).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
147. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 573 (6th ed. 2012)
(explaining how authors such as John Grisham, Michael Crichton, and J.K.
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without the original author’s permission creates a work that is
derivative per § 101 of the original author’s copyrighted work,
that person is liable for infringement of the original author’s
copyright in the preexisting work.148 While derivative works must
satisfy the § 102 requirements to achieve independent protection,
“the Act does not require that the derivative work be protectable
for its preparation to infringe.”149
In sum, a derivative work is based on a preexisting work and
transforms that work’s content.150 The author of preexisting
copyrighted work is protected from infringing derivative works in
two ways: he can seek independent protection for his own
derivative works,151 and the derivative works of others infringe on
his exclusive right to prepare such works.152 An understanding of
derivative works and the rights associated with them will be
especially important in copyright cases involving 3D printing
because infringement actions are likely to arise in cases of
transformations of content and shifting media.153

Rowling have earned more money from film adaptations and commercial tie-ins
based on their books than they have for the books themselves).
148. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[The] copyright holder enjoys the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
based on [Duke Nukem 3D]. . . . [T]he audiovisual displays generated when
[Duke Nukem 3D] is run in conjunction with the N/I CD MAP files are
derivative works that infringe this exclusivity.”).
149. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright,
30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 231 n.75 (1983) [hereinafter Goldstein,
Derivative Rights]; accord Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740
F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984)) (“[I]t makes no difference that the derivation may
not satisfy certain requirements for statutory copyright registration itself.”).
150. See supra notes 130–42 and accompanying text (explaining the
requirements for derivative works).
151. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (discussing how a
derivative work can be independently copyrightable).
152. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text (explaining how a work
can infringe on an author’s right to prepare derivative works).
153. See, e.g., Nathan Hurst, HBO Blocks 3-D Printed Game of Thrones
iPhone Dock, WIRED (Feb. 13, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/
2013/02/got-hbo-cease-and-desist/all (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (describing how
HBO sent a cease and desist letter to an individual who designed a CAD file for
an iPhone dock resembling the Iron Throne from the Game of Thrones television
series) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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V. Fair Use

In cases in which the court will find a work otherwise
infringing, fair use is the defendant’s primary shield, “the most
important—and amorphous—limitation on the otherwise
extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners under
§ 106 of the Act.”154 Section 107 of the Copyright Act, intending to
codify common law doctrine,155 specifically provides for the
defense of fair use.156 Under the statute the court shall consider
four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.157

Insofar as “these factors are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of
reason’ balance,” no one factor should be dispositive.158 An inquiry
need not end there, however. The factors are not exhaustive;
rather, courts may take into account other considerations.159

154. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2008).
155. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“The bill endorses the purpose
and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition
to freeze the doctrine in the statute . . . .”).
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections
106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
157. Id.
158. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454
(1984).
159. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Other relevant factors may also be considered, since fair use is
an ‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall purposes of the
Copyright Act.” (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 448, 454)).
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A. The Purpose and Character of the Use
Courts have divided the first fair use factor—the purpose and
the character of the use—into two separate inquiries: whether the
use is commercial or noncommercial, and whether the use is
transformative.160 An analysis of the first factor thus requires an
examination of both subfactors.
1. Commercial or Noncommercial Use
The first inquiry concerning the fair use factor of purpose
and character of the use is whether the use in question is
commercial or noncommercial. As the Supreme Court noted in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,161 “every
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright.”162 On the other hand, noncommercial use
will constitute fair use unless there is “proof either that the
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread,
it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
160. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing first whether the search engine’s use of thumbnail photos was
commercial, and then noting that “the second part of the inquiry . . . involves the
transformative nature of the use”). After Sony, courts tended to consider only
whether the use was commercial or noncommercial until Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994)
(reestablishing that commercial use alone is not sufficient to find against fair
use, but that courts must also consider whether the use has a transformative
purpose).
161. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, the court considered whether the sale of
Betamax video tape recorders (VTRs) to the public violated any of plaintiff’s
copyrights. Id. at 420. In examining whether VTR users engaged in
unauthorized “time-shifting” (recording publicly broadcast programs for later
viewings) constituted copyright infringement, the Court focused on the fair use
doctrine. Id. at 447. The Court conducted the four-factor analysis provided in 17
U.S.C. § 107, focusing on the fact that those who recorded television programs
did so for private, noncommercial use, and that VTR recordings would likely
benefit the market for plaintiff’s home videos rather than harm it. Id. at 449–53.
The Court concluded that use of the Betamax VTRs constituted fair use and
that “Sony’s sale of [Betamax] equipment to the general public does not
constitute contributory infringement of respondents’ copyrights.” Id. at 456.
162. Id. at 451.

620

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014)

work.”163 In Sony, the Court agreed with the district court’s
findings that owners’ use of Betamax video tape recorders to
record television programs for personal, non-profit-making
purposes was noncommercial.164 Since Sony, however, courts and
scholars have clarified what constitutes noncommercial use165
and have rejected the notion that commercial use creates a
presumption against fair use.166
Although Sony drew the commercial–noncommercial line at
whether the user sought to make a profit,167 courts have since
gone further in defining what constitutes a commercial use. In
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.,168 the Ninth Circuit stated that
“[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a
commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of
copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, may
constitute a commercial use.”169 In determining whether peer-topeer file sharing constituted fair use, the court found that the use
was “commercial . . . demonstrated by a showing that repeated
and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were
made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies.”170 A
163. Id.
164. See id. at 450 (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.
The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District
Court’s findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must
be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”).
165. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001)
(positing that “[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a
commercial use”).
166. Beebe, supra note 154, at 571–72 (discussing circuit courts’ criticism of
the so-called “Sony presumption” and how the Supreme Court eventually
“explicitly demoted the commerciality of the defendant’s use to merely one issue
among others that a court may consider as part of its analysis of the ‘purpose
and character’ of the defendant’s use”).
167. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450
(1984) (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profitmaking purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court’s findings
plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”).
168. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
169. Id. at 1015.
170. Id.
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use is commercial, therefore, either if it is for purposes of making
a profit or if it provides an alternative, free means of obtaining
copyrighted material.
But while courts have broadened the definition of a
commercial use, they have reduced the impact of a finding that
such use is commercial. Although the Supreme Court determined
in Sony that a finding of commercial use creates a presumption
against fair use,171 the Court explicitly rejected the “Sony
presumption” in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.172 The Court
explained that “[t]he language of the statute makes clear that the
commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one
element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and
character.”173 If commerciality of the use were the sole
determining consideration in the first factor, “the presumption
would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment,
criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these
activities ‘are generally conducted for profit in this country.’”174
Since Campbell, courts have considered commercial use an
important but not dispositive consideration weighing against fair
use.175
2. Transformative Purpose
Because whether a use was commercial could no longer by
itself determine the first factor, courts needed to focus on other
considerations. The Supreme Court provided such a consideration
171. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 (establishing the “Sony presumption”).
172. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“In giving
virtually dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of
Appeals erred.”).
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
175. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“A commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use but is not conclusive on
the issue.”); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that the first factor inquiry was not over simply
because the defendant did not dispute that its purpose was commercial).
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in Campbell, determining that a “transformative purpose”
weighed in favor of fair use.176 The Court defined
transformativeness as “add[ing] something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”177 Furthermore, in
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, Professor R.
Anthony Reese differentiates between transformativeness in fair
use and derivative works analyses.178 Professor Reese explains
that transformativeness in the latter context requires a
transformation of content, but for fair use, courts instead “focus
on whether the purpose of the defendant’s use is
transformative.”179 For example, while courts have determined
that parody180 and thumbnail reproductions of copyrighted
photographs for Internet search engines181 are sufficiently
transformative purposes, a “space-shift” of digital music file
storage from CD format to an online MP3 database is not.182

176. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).
177. Id.
178. See Reese, supra note 131, at 494 (comparing transformativeness in
terms of the derivative work right with transformativeness in terms of fair use).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. See id. (“Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value . . . .”).
181. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003)
(determining that the defendant search engine’s use of a thumbnail
reproduction of the plaintiff photographer’s copyrighted work served a
functional, rather than aesthetic purpose, and therefore was sufficiently
transformative); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Although an image may have been created originally to serve an
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms
the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.”).
182. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that “a transformative ‘space shift’ by which
subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings contained on their CDs without
lugging around the physical discs themselves” was a simply a transformation to
another medium, and not a transformative purpose as required under the first
fair use factor).
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B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor per § 107 of the Copyright Act,
after the purpose and character of the use, is “the nature of the
copyrighted work.”183 Courts have examined the nature of the
copyrighted work through two inquiries. First, they have focused
on whether a work is creative or noncreative, positing that the
former is “closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
are mere fact-based works” and thus more likely to be covered by
fair use.184 Second, “[p]ublished works are more likely [than
unpublished works] to qualify as fair use because the first
appearance of the artist’s expression has already occurred.”185
Courts often do not even mention this factor, and when they do, it
seldom plays a role in the outcome of the case.186
C. The Amount of the Portion Used in Relation to the Copyrighted
Work as a Whole
Section 107 directs courts to consider as the third fair use
factor “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”187 The Ninth Circuit
has explained that “the extent of permissible copying varies with
the purpose and character of the use.”188 But generally, “the more
the defendant takes of the plaintiff’s work, the less likely it is
that the taking will qualify as a fair use.”189 This does not mean,
however, that copying a work in its entirety will preclude a
finding of fair use.190 Rather, the question is whether the new
183. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
184. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001).
185. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
186. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 610 (“Despite § 107[] . . . 17.7% of the 306
opinions failed even to refer to the factor, while an additional 6.5% did so only to
call it irrelevant. . . . [T]he outcome of factor two typically has no significant
effect on the overall outcome of the fair use test.”).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
188. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
189. Beebe, supra note 154, at 615.
190. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.
2007) (“The fact that Google incorporates the entire Perfect 10 image in to the
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work uses a sufficient amount of the copyrighted work to
supersede that work.191
D. The Effect on the Market of the Copyrighted Use
Finally, for the fourth fair use factor, § 107 directs courts to
consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.”192 The factor applies to “[n]ot only
the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the
alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and wide-spread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the
original.’”193 For example, the Court in Sony decided that the sale
of Betamax recorders would not negatively affect either television
revenue through a decline in ratings or the infant home video
industry.194 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Napster
that peer-to-peer file sharing sites harm the music industry both
by reducing CD sales and by preventing record companies from
entering the digital download market.195 Furthermore, Justice
O’Connor noted that this factor is “undoubtedly the single most

search engine results does not diminish the transformative nature of Google’s
use.”).
191. See id. at 1165–66 (determining that Google’s use did not supersede
Perfect 10’s copyrighted photographs because there was no evidence that users
were downloading the thumbnail images on Google instead of paying for access
to the copyrighted images).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
193. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994) (quoting 3
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1993)).
194. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
452–53 (1984) (rejecting the argument “that live television or movie audiences
will decrease as more people watch Betamax tapes as an alternative”).
195. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Napster harms the market in ‘at least’ two ways: it reduces audio CD sales
among college students and it ‘raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market
for digital downloading of music.’” (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000))).
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important element of fair use.”196 Some scholars, however, have
questioned whether this is really the case.197
E. Other Considerations
Although § 107 provides only four factors, courts have
interpreted the statute as permitting other considerations.198 The
legislative history of the Copyright Act supports this
interpretation, explaining that “since the doctrine is an equitable
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible.”199
Furthermore, “there [was] no disposition to freeze the doctrine in
the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change.”200 In considering unenumerated factors, courts have
focused on the extent to which the use in question benefits the
public.201 Although the courts have considered the public benefit
of a use while analyzing other § 107 factors,202 the Supreme Court
196. Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
197. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 154, at 617 (arguing that the fourth factor is
the “most important” only because it “essentially constitutes a metafactor under
which courts integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in doing so,
arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth factor, but of the overall test”).
This explains why a court’s determination of the fourth factor almost always
coincides with its conclusion of whether the fair use defense applied. See id.
(“[O]f the 141 opinions that found that factor four disfavored fair use, 140 found
no fair use.”). For more on Beebe’s criticisms of current fair use doctrine, see
infra notes 451–65 and accompanying text.
198. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Other relevant factors may also be considered, since fair use is
an ‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall purposes of the
Copyright Act.” (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 448, 454 (1984))).
199. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return to an
‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the public good.”).
202. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 (9th Cir.
2007) (integrating the public benefit inquiry into the court’s first factor analysis
by examining “the significantly transformative nature of Google’s search engine,
particularly in light of its public benefit”); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[Analysis of the fourth fair
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has also considered public benefit as an independent factor in the
balancing test.203
Under the current doctrine, therefore, a fair use inquiry
consists of the four statutory factors,204 and if the court elects to
consider them, other extrinsic factors.205 The issue of whether
courts can effectively apply the current doctrine to 3D printing
cases will ultimately hinge on the extent to which courts can—
and should—consider factors besides those mentioned explicitly
in the statute.206
VI. Analysis of the Legal Issues Pertaining to 3D Printing
Among the copyright issues pertaining to 3D printing are the
following: whether CAD files are copyrightable; whether CAD
files and 3D-printed objects are derivative works protected by
copyrights on already-existing works; and whether courts can
adequately apply the fair use defense as currently constructed to
cases in which defendants have 3D printed or created CAD files
of copyrighted works.207 It is necessary to examine these issues in
use factor] requires a balancing of ‘the benefit the public will derive if the use is
permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is
denied.’” (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981))).
203. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454
(1984) (“The District Court’s conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television
programs, it yields societal benefits.”).
204. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (providing the four factors
from § 107).
205. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (explaining the
justification for courts’ consideration of other factors, including the public
benefit of the use).
206. See infra Part VI.C.2–3 (criticizing the current doctrine and advocating
for the application in the context of 3D printing of Professor Edward Lee’s
technological fair use, which considers the public benefit of the technology and
the potential harm to the market of that technology if the court finds no fair
use).
207. See supra Part I (setting out the issues of this Note). Another copyright
issue that will likely arise in the context of 3D printing is whether websites such
as Thingiverse will be secondarily liable for a third party’s infringement. See
Rideout, supra note 53, at 170–73 (discussing whether Thingiverse would fall
under one of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor provisions).
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this order. Whether CAD files are copyrightable will determine
how they fit into the derivative works inquiry,208 and to assess
whether the fair use doctrine applies in a particular case, one
must know whether works are protected in the first place.209
A. Copyrightability of CAD Files
Copyrightability issues in the context of 3D printing center
on the copyrightability of CAD files. 3D-printed objects fall
clearly within the category of “pictorial, graphical, and sculptural
works” protected by copyright,210 and courts will likely be able to
discern the copyrightability of such objects within the current
jurisprudence.211 CAD files, on the other hand, do not fit neatly
into one of the categories explicitly listed in the Copyright Act. A
CAD file is a computer file used to send a design to a 3D
printer,212 but it is also the 3D-printable design itself.213 To
concentrate only on the copyrightability of the design is to ignore
the copyrightability of the computer code, and vice versa.
208. See supra notes 138–39, 141–49, and accompanying text (discussing
how a work must be based on a preexisting copyrighted work to be protected as
a derivative work, and whether a derivative work must independently meet the
copyrightability requirements to be protected).
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (providing the four factors for fair use, all of
which refer to the “copyrighted work”); see also, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen Inc.,
154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding first that the defendant’s
compilation of user-created video game levels infringed on the plaintiff’s right to
create derivative works, and then considering whether the defendant’s
compilation was a fair use).
210. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing as copyrightable works “(1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”).
211. See Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 8–13 (concentrating
on the useful article doctrine and separability as exemplified in cases such as
Brandir and Barnhart to determine whether 3D-printed objects would be
copyrightable). For discussion on whether 3D-printed objects are independently
copyrightable derivative works, see infra Part VI.B.2.
212. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing how a CAD
file sends code to a 3D printer to produce the 3D-printed object).
213. See The Wired 3D Print-Off, supra note 26 (including the twodimensional computer renderings of the CAD drawing contest entries).
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Furthermore, because the § 102(a) criteria of originality and
fixation in a tangible medium are relatively lenient,214 the
question of copyrightability will depend on limitations such as the
useful article doctrine215 and the idea–expression dichotomy.216 To
evaluate how these limitations apply to CAD files, it will be
helpful first to search for an analog among other types of works
that the courts have had the opportunity to examine.217 Through
a survey of the copyrightability of works potentially analogous to
CAD files—architectural plans and other technical drawings,
recipes, computer software, and computer program outputs—and
comparing these works to CAD files, this subpart formulates a
test for copyrightability of CAD files.
1. Searching for a Work Analogous to CAD Files
When Congress and the courts have confronted copyright
issues surrounding new technologies, they have often resorted to
analogy. In its final report to Congress, the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)
concluded that “the computer affects the copyright status of a
resultant work no more than the employment of a still or motionpicture camera, a tape recorder, or a typewriter.”218 Similarly,
courts have compared circuit boards that speed up the rate of
play in video games to playing phonograph records at faster-thanrecorded speeds,219 and they have equated a detailed description
214. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Copyright Act sets a relatively low threshold with the originality and fixation
requirements but that other statutory limits exist).
215. See supra Part III.B.2 (defining and discussing the useful article
doctrine).
216. See supra Part III.B.1 (defining and discussing the idea–expression
dichotomy).
217. See Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 22 (“[I]t is possible to
draw guidance and principles by analogy from cases not involving 3D
printing . . . .”).
218. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 45 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
219. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir.
1983) (“There is this critical difference between playing records at a faster than
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of an audiovisual display to sheet music.220 Searching for proper
analogies to CAD files, therefore, seems an appropriate place to
begin a copyrightability inquiry.
a. Architectural Plans
Given that CAD files are often described as blueprints,221 it
makes sense to begin by examining whether this is an
appropriate comparison. The Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA)222 amended § 102 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 to include architectural works among the
list of explicitly copyright-eligible works of authorship.223 The
amendment also included in its definition of architectural work
“the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of
expression, including a building, architectural plans, or
drawings.”224 Because the architectural work itself is embodied in
the plans, a copyright in the blueprint extends protection not just
to the plans but also to the physical structure itself, even if it has
not yet been constructed.225
recorded speed and playing video games at a faster than manufactured rate:
there is an enormous demand for speeded-up video games but there is little if
any demand for speeded-up records.”).
220. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“This raises the interesting question whether an exact, down to the last detail,
description of an audiovisual display counts as a permanent or concrete form for
purposes of Galoob. . . . What, after all, does sheet music do but describe in
precise detail the way a copyrighted melody sounds?”).
221. See Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 (“3D printing starts
with a blueprint, usually one created with a computer aided design (CAD)
program running on a desktop computer.”); Hanna, supra note 12
(“Downloading or sharing [CAD] files could constitute copyright infringement,
although the strength of the protection for such files will turn on whether courts
treat them more like blueprints than art.”); Greenberg, supra note 16
(discussing the number of “blueprints” uploaded onto Thingiverse in the past
year).
222. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
102(a)(8), 120 (2012).
223. See id. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . architectural
works.”).
224. Id. § 101.
225. See Hunt v. Pasternack, 192 F.3d 877, 878–79 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because
the statute provides that the copyright is in the design as embodied not only in a
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Although architectural plans seem like a logical analog to
CAD files, important differences make the comparison
inappropriate. CAD files and blueprints are both pictorial
depictions of 3D structures that may eventually be built—hence
the comparisons between the two in news articles explaining how
3D printing works.226 If CAD files were afforded the same
protection as architectural blueprints, then the CAD designer
would receive copyright protection not only for the CAD file itself
but for any 3D-printed versions that might eventually exist. Such
protection would be appealing for designers, given the volume of
CAD downloads on sites such as Thingiverse.227 Congress,
however, granted broad protection specifically to architectural
works, as embodied in plans.228 Moreover, Congress granted this
extra protection to architectural works through plans to address
a particular problem: “a potential gap in protection may exist
where an architectural work has been depicted in plans or
drawings, but has not yet been constructed.”229 Congress was
concerned that in the months or years between the completion of
architectural plans and the end of construction on the
architectural work itself, someone “could construct an identical
building but escape liability so long as the plans or drawings were
not copyrighted.”230 The same problem, however, does not exist
with 3D printing. If a CAD designer desires a copyright in the
3D-printed object itself, he need only wait a few hours at most for
building, but alternatively in the architectural plans, we hold that construction
of the actual building was not required.”); Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland
Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Now the
holder of a copyright in architectural plans is entitled to two forms of protection
under the Act[:] . . . one in the architectural work (§ 102(a)(8)), the other in the
plans or drawings (§ 102(a)(5)).” (citing T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc.,
459 F.3d 97, 109 (1st Cir. 2006))).
226. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (providing such
comparisons).
227. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (explaining how Thingiverse’s downloads
doubled in 2012 to 8.5 million with half a million between August and
November).
228. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text (explaining how the
AWCPA added protection for architectural works).
229. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990).
230. Id.

CAD’S CRADLE

631

a 3D printer to complete the finished product.231 CAD files are not
explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, and they do not
present the same problems as architectural plans. Therefore,
basing a determination of the copyrightability of CAD files on the
copyrightability of architectural plans would be inappropriate.
b. Other Technical Drawings and Pre-1990 Architectural Plans
Perhaps a more accurate comparison to CAD files would be
technical drawings in general. Whereas Congress has provided
for the protection of architectural works as a special category, it
included technical drawings in its definition of pictorial,
graphical, and sculptural works.232 Copyright protection for
technical drawings, however, extends only to the drawings
themselves, rather than also extending to finished products such
as recreational vehicles233 or medicine cabinets.234 Similarly,
before Congress passed the AWCPA in 1990, architectural plans
were limited to protection as pictorial or graphical works.235
231. See Olson, supra note 45 (“With 3-D printing, it takes just hours [to
create a prototype].”).
232. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’
include . . . technical drawings . . . .”). Courts have recognized on numerous
occasions that technical drawings fall within the category of pictorial or
graphical works included in § 102(a). See, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland
Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Graphic
works, including technical drawings, are among the works that are eligible for
copyright protection.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012))); Niemi v. Am. Axle
Mfg. & Holding, Inc., No. 05-74210, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50153, at *7 (E.D.
Mich. July 24, 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ technical drawings are original pictorial or
graphic works protected by 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).”).
233. See Forest River, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (“However, because the
Plaintiff’s copyright protects the design drawing from being copied, and the
Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant created derivative Floor Plan
drawings, it states a claim for copyright infringement as to the copies (as
distinct from the actual trailer).”).
234. See Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435–36 (S.D.
W. Va. 2003) (determining that copyrights in technical drawings of medicine
cabinets did not extend to the cabinets themselves).
235. See Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It
is settled law that architectural drawings and plans are thus eligible for
protection under the copyright code as ‘pictorial, graphic, [or] sculptural
works.’”). In Eales, the court concluded that the AWCPA would not have applied
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Courts limit the copyrights to the drawings themselves because of
the useful article doctrine.236 While the “AWCPA now extends
copyright protection to as-built architectural works, [it] does not
extend that protection to other useful articles.”237 Except in the
case of architectural works, for which Congress made a specific
exception, the Copyright Act “does not afford, to the owner of
copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any
greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution,
or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to
such works under the law.”238 In other words, while the drawing
of an object may be copyrighted, the object portrayed in the
drawing must overcome the useful article doctrine to receive
protection.
More importantly, however, the useful article doctrine does
not bar the copyrightability of technical drawings themselves.239
One could argue that by serving as a blueprint for the
construction of an object, a technical drawing is not copyrightable
because it has a utilitarian function.240 Section 107 of the
Copyright Act, however, defines a useful article as one that has
“an intrinsic utilitarian function that [does] not merely . . .
portray the appearance of the article or . . . convey
information.”241 The Ninth Circuit noted in Eales v.
to the plaintiff’s architectural plans even if the copyright had not arose before
the AWCPA was passed because “this case involves a claim of infringement of
copyrighted plans, not a structure.” Id. at 880 n.2. The Ninth Circuit later
acknowledged that this conclusion was incorrect and that the AWCPA should
apply in cases in which the building has not yet been constructed. See Hunt v.
Pasternack, 192 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It is now clear that this dicta in
Eales is inaccurate.”).
236. See supra Part III.B.2 for an explanation of the useful article doctrine.
237. Forest River, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 760; see also Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d
at 434–36 (refusing to extend protection in a technical drawing of a medicine
cabinet to the physical cabinets because of the useful article doctrine, despite
the AWCPA’s extension of similar protection to architectural works).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012).
239. See infra notes 241–45 and accompanying text (explaining why
technical drawings themselves do not fail a useful article inquiry).
240. See Eales, 958 F.2d at 879 (outlining the defendants’ argument that the
plaintiff’s plans were not copyrightable because they did not survive the useful
article exception to copyrightability).
241. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
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Environmental
Lifestyles,
Inc.242
that,
unlike
with
noncopyrightable useful articles, “the intrinsic function of an
architectural plan is to convey the information necessary to
enable the reader to construct a building.”243 Because the court
decided Eales by treating the architectural plans at issue as
pictorial or graphical works instead of applying the AWCPA,244 it
is logical to conclude that the intrinsic function of any technical
drawing is to convey information necessary to enable the reader
to build the depicted object.245 Finally, technical drawings survive
the idea–expression dichotomy because the act of composing the
drawing serves as expression of the design itself.246
At first glance, technical drawings seem to be the perfect
analog for CAD files. Like technical drawings, CAD files are
designs that convey to the builder necessary information to
construct a 3D object. But while architectural plans and other
technical drawings convey information to human beings, who
then build the object themselves or with the help of machines,
CAD files send coded information directly to a 3D printer, which
then constructs the 3D object without human intervention.247 It is
unclear whether the statutory exception to useful articles,
permitting copyrightability of those works whose “intrinsic
utilitarian function . . . convey[s] information,”248 applies only to
242. 958 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1992).
243. Id. at 879–80.
244. See supra note 235 (explaining how architectural plans were
protectable only as pictorial or graphical works until Congress passed the
AWCPA).
245. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (applying the doctrine from NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT that “a copyright for a work of utility protects only against copying of
such works for purposes of explanation” to a nonarchitectural technical drawing
(quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[D][2] (1990))).
246. See Eales, 958 F.2d at 880 (“Eales’ plans laid out the location and sizes
of numerous features of model home #3, and thus her ideas were ‘fixed’ in
tangible form. That is all the copyright code requires. Eales won damages
because defendants copied the plans she drew, not the idea she created.”
(citations omitted)).
247. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (explaining the process
through which a CAD file goes from a drawing on a screen to a 3D-printed
object).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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information conveyed to a human being, or whether digitally
conveyed computer code would be covered.249 If the function of
sending code to a 3D printer did fall under the statutory
definition of useful article, then one would have to determine if
the design were conceptually or physically separable from the
functional code.250 Furthermore, while one who reads a blueprint
must interpret the design and included dimensions to determine
the process by which the object should be constructed, “CAD
files . . . carry directions for manufacturing objects.”251 Although
the design-drawing element of a CAD file would on its own
survive the idea–expression dichotomy,252 nothing in the case law
concerning technical drawings addresses whether the code
component of a CAD file constitutes copyrightable expression.253
Therefore, one must look elsewhere to determine the
copyrightability of CAD files given their inclusion of coded
instructions.
c. Recipes
Recipes are one type of work consisting of a set of
instructions for which courts have examined the question of
copyrightability. In Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith
249. See infra Part VI.B.3 (analyzing how both the useful article doctrine
and the idea–expression dichotomy apply to CAD files in the merger inquiry of
this Note’s proposed test).
250. See supra notes 106–25 and accompanying text (outlining the various
tests for physical and conceptual separability); infra notes 351–56 and
accompanying text (applying those tests to CAD files).
251. Regalado, supra note 20.
252. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining why the
blueprints in Eales survived the idea–expression dichotomy).
253. See e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753
F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (concerning hand-drawn technical
drawings and therefore not addressing issues of whether a code component of a
drawing is copyrightable). Even in cases concerning non-CAD virtual models,
courts have not considered whether the computer code corresponding to the
model is copyrightable. See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.,
528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining that Meshwerks’s derivative
virtual models of Toyota’s cars were not sufficiently original because they did
not depict any expressive elements that were not Toyota’s).
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Corp.,254 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the “functional
listing of ingredients” in a Dannon Yogurt cookbook did not
constitute copyrightable subject matter.255 The court noted that
the plaintiff “was not giving literary expression to his individual
creative labors. Instead he was writing down an idea, namely the
ingredients necessary to the preparation of a particular dish.”256
Furthermore, a recipe that includes preparation instructions does
not survive the idea–expression dichotomy.257 In certain cases,
however, recipes can be “sufficiently expressive to exceed the
boundaries of mere fact.”258 When a recipe includes “‘suggestions
for presentation, advice on wines to go with the meal, or hints on
place settings with appropriate music,’ . . . ‘tales of their
historical or ethnic origin[,’ or] light-hearted or helpful
commentary,” those aspects of the recipe may be copyrightable.259
To fall on the expression side of the idea–expression dichotomy, a
recipe must contain “literary expression.”260
Like recipes, then, CAD files’ computer codes might be
copyrightable if they contain some form of literary expression.
The obvious problem with recipes as an analog to CAD files,
however, is that while recipes’ instructions are written for human
interpretation, CAD files’ instructions are written in computer
code for a 3D printer to read. Thus, it is impossible to measure
what constitutes literary expression in computer code by
analyzing literary expression in a cookbook.261 To answer
questions about the idea–expression dichotomy in terms of CAD
254. 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
255. Id. at 480.
256. Id.
257. See Harrell v. St. John, 792 F. Supp. 2d 933, 943 (S.D. Miss. 2011)
(“The recipes are nothing more than a list of ingredients with very basic
assembly or preparation instructions.”).
258. Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
259. Id. (quoting Publ’ns Int’l, 88 F.3d at 481).
260. Harrell, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
261. Compare Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–
10 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering whether code contains nonessential elements or
elements dictated by external factors such as mechanical specifications of
computers on which a program will run), with Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121–23 (2d Cir. 1930) (examining whether characters and
plot in a play are copyrightable despite the idea–expression dichotomy).
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files, it will be necessary to examine the copyrightability of
computer code.
d. Computer Software
Courts have addressed the copyrightability of computer code
primarily in the context of software.262 Computer programs are
copyrightable in two respects: their codes are protected as
“literary works,” and their outputs—what appears on the
screen—are protected as “audiovisual works.”263 Courts have
struggled with the idea–expression dichotomy in computer
software cases because “computer programs are written for a
utilitarian purpose. Expression in the code or structure and
organization of a program is normally only incidental to that
purpose. Courts must therefore identify and protect that
incidental material, while leaving the functional aspects of the
program free for all to duplicate.”264 Because a computer program
can be broken down into a number of different levels of code—
individual mathematical instructions, subroutines, routines,
software modules, higher-level modules, and overall function—
the Second Circuit developed the abstraction–filtration–
comparison test to discern copyrightability at each level of the
software.265 The abstraction–filtration–comparison test is a sort
of “all-in-one” test that determines both copyrightability and
infringement. First the court “dissects” the program into its
constituent parts, concentrating on the part of the program upon
262. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st
Cir. 1995) (concerning the copyrightability of a spreadsheet program); Altai, 982
F.2d at 698 (concerning the copyrightability of a job-scheduling program for IBM
mainframe computers); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797
F.2d 1222, 1224 (3d Cir. 1986) (concerning the copyrightability of a computer
program for dental laboratory record keeping).
263. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 6 n.25 (noting that the 1980 amendments
to the Copyright Act added a definition of “computer program” to § 101, but did
not include them in the list of protectable works because CONTU considered
them to be both literary and audiovisual works).
264. Id. at 7.
265. See id. at 13 (explaining why the Second Circuit developed the
abstraction–filtration–comparison test in Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc.).
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which the defendant is allegedly infringing.266 Second, the court
“‘filter[s]’ the unprotectable elements out of the program
structure at every level of abstraction.”267 Finally, the court
compares the remaining copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s
program to those of the allegedly infringing program.268 Given
that the inquiry at hand concerns copyrightability and not
whether a specific work is infringing, one should focus on the
abstraction and filtration portions of the test.
While the concept of abstraction is fairly straightforward—
break the program into its constituent parts269—the Second
Circuit elaborated on the filtration portion in Computer
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.270 The filtration
process weeds out structural components of a program that
constitute any of the following: “elements dictated by efficiency,”
“elements dictated by external factors,” and “elements taken from
the public domain.”271 “Elements dictated by efficiency” refer to
those portions of code that a programmer can express in only so
many ways to avoid superfluity.272 Such code is not copyrightable
because the expression of the code has merged with the idea—the
task that it performs.273 Those elements of the program that are
not necessarily incidental to the idea pass this first level of
filtration.274 An element of a program is “dictated by external
factors” if
the programmer’s freedom of design choice is . . .
circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 13–14.
269. See id at 13. (“The first step in this process is to break the ‘structure’ of
a computer program into different levels of abstraction . . . .”).
270. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
271. Id. at 707–10.
272. See id. at 708 (“In the context of computer program design, the concept
of efficiency is akin to deriving the most concise logical proof or formulating the
most succinct mathematical computation.”).
273. See id. at 709 (concluding “that application of the merger doctrine in
this setting is an effective way to eliminate non-protectable expression
contained in computer programs”).
274. See id. at 708 (determining that those components that are “necessarily
incidental” to the idea are not protectable).
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mechanical specifications of the computer on which a
particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility
requirements of other programs with which a program is
designed
to
operate
in
conjunction;
(3) computer
manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the industry
being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices
within the computer industry.275

Finally, an element of a program that has “entered the public
domain by virtue of freely accessible program exchanges and the
like” is not protected.276 Although the abstraction–filtration–
comparison test is now widely accepted by the courts (albeit
generating inconsistent results),277 the First Circuit added in
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.278 that
courts could circumvent the abstraction–filtration–comparison
test if the program element in question was itself a
noncopyrightable “idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery”279 under § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act.280
While the abstraction–filtration–comparison test appears
capable of answering the question of whether the code in a CAD
file is copyrightable expression, this potential analog also
presents problems. On the one hand, it would be easy enough to
“filter” the code of a CAD file through the three steps of the Altai
test’s filtration portion. The test would work perfectly if the issue
were the copyrightability of the CAD program in which one
designed a CAD file. The problem is that the designer of a CAD
file does not write the file’s code—at least, not in the sense that
the programmer of the CAD software does.281 For example, in
275. Id. at 709–10.
276. Id. at 710.
277. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 17–19 (discussing the various
inconsistent results among the circuit courts in applying the test from Altai).
278. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
279. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
280. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815 (holding “that the Lotus menu command
hierarchy is an uncopyrightable ‘method of operation’” without applying the
Altai test).
281. See The STL Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, supra note 45
(“Most fabber users do not need to be concerned with [the details of StL code]. It
is provided here for those who are interested in developing hardware or software
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Tinkercad, a web-based solid modeling CAD program,282 the
designer creates a CAD file by applying pre-rendered shapes onto
a virtual “workplane” and altering their dimensions to create a
3D model.283 The specific design that the user creates will
determine the exact code that is sent to the 3D printer, but the
programmer of the software itself must predetermine the
individual pieces of the code with which the user composes the
CAD file.284 By comparison, the author of a Microsoft Word
document is not the author of the code that her computer sends to
a traditional 2D printer when she wishes to obtain a hard copy.
Thus, while using computer software as an analog to 3D printing
presents a useful test for the copyrightability of the code itself, it
is limited to cases in which the work in question is the software
itself, rather than a work produced using that software.
e. Computer-Generated Works and Program Outputs
The final potential analogs to CAD files are computergenerated works and program outputs. The author of a computergenerated work is the person who created the work itself, rather
than the person who created the underlying program.285 That
said, “[t]he ultimate use of a program or data base might limit or
negate the author’s claim of copyright in the ultimate work.”286
On the one hand, the author of a literary work created on
Microsoft Word would clearly hold the copyright on that work
that will read or write StL files.”).
282. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing solid modeling
software—as opposed to surface modeling software—as providing users with
pre-rendered shapes that the CAD designer can then manipulate).
283. Tinkercad, TINKERCAD, https://tinkercad.com/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2014) (providing a free tutorial on how to use Tinkercad and presenting the
option to download the software for free) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
284. See The STL Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, supra note 45
(providing templates for the code syntax in .stl files).
285. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 218, at 45 (“It appears to the
Commission that authorship of the program or of the input data is entirely
separate from authorship of the final work . . . .”).
286. Id. at 45–46.

640

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014)

over Bill Gates.287 But on the other hand, courts have granted
video game creators copyrights in program outputs (the images
displayed on the screen) despite the fact that players ultimately
control what image appears onscreen at a given time.288 In Stern
Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,289 the Second Circuit determined
that although “the entire sequence of all the sights and sounds of
the game are different each time the game is played, depending
upon the route and speed the player selects for his spaceship and
the timing and accuracy of his release of his craft’s bombs and
lasers,” the creator of the game could hold a valid copyright
because “many aspects of the sights and the sequence of their
appearance remain constant during each play of the game. . . .
The repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and
sounds of the game qualifies for copyright protection as an
audiovisual work.”290
When a designer uses a CAD program, there are arguably
two different outputs: the design drawing and the code. The
former is clearly a computer-generated work, and the author
holds the copyright. As with the author of a Word document, a
CAD file designer is responsible for the entire creative content of
the design. Although programs with premade shape libraries
might place some limits on the design, the designer’s ability to
resize and position these shapes ultimately distinguishes such
CAD software from video game outputs, in which the player has
comparatively little impact on the program output.291
287. See MARK A. LEMLEY, PETER S. MENELL, ROBERT P. MERGES, PAMELA
SAMUELSON & BRIAN W. CARVER, SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 73 (4th ed. 2011)
(“It would be unreasonable to suggest, for example, that the creator of a wordprocessing program owned the documents written using that program.”).
288. See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“We agree with the District Court that the player’s participation does not
withdraw the audiovisual work from copyright eligibility. . . . Assessing the
entire effect of the game as it appears and sounds, we conclude that its
repetitive sequence of images is copyrightable as an audiovisual display.”).
289. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
290. Id. at 856.
291. Compare id. (explaining that the “appearance . . . of the player’s
spaceship, the enemy craft, the ground missile bases and fuel depots, and the
terrain over which . . . the player’s ship fl[ew], as well as the sequence in which
the missile bases, fuel depots, and terrain appear[ed]” remained constant
regardless of the player’s manipulations), with Tinkercad, supra note 283
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The real question is whether the code portion of the CAD file
is more like a computer-generated work or a program output.
Although program outputs differ from code insofar as they are
audiovisual and literary works, respectively,292 they are similar in
the context of a CAD file because the CAD designer can claim as
little responsibility, if not less, for the content of the code as a
video game player can claim for the output on the screen. But
because a program output is an audiovisual work, a video game
player can at least directly control what her character does
onscreen.293 A CAD designer, however, “creates” the code
necessary to print a 3D object only by creating the design. In
some programs, at least, he cannot even see the code that
corresponds to his design much less write the literary work.294 On
the other hand, the video game player has complete control over a
relatively small portion of the game, whereas the CAD designer
ultimately determines the final compilation of code sent to a 3D
printer (even if the CAD software programmer chooses the syntax
of the code295 and is responsible for determining what code
represents a premade shape or a freehand-drawn line of a certain
length and angle). If the building blocks of code in a CAD file are
basic enough, the CAD designer, as opposed to the CAD software
programmer, might be able to claim authorship over the code
portion of the CAD file. Thus, using computer-generated works
and program outputs as an analog can shape the analysis of
whether the CAD designer or the software programmer is the
author of the code (and therefore whether the abstraction–
(allowing the designer to manipulate the dimensions of premade shapes and to
place them as he chooses in the virtual “workplane”).
292. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (explaining how CONTU
recognized the output of a computer program to be a copyrightable audiovisual
work and the code to be a copyrightable literary work).
293. See Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 853 (“The player controls the altitude and
speed of the spaceship, decides when to release the ship’s supply of bombs, and
fires lasers that can destroy attacking missiles and aircraft.”).
294. See Tinkercad, supra note 283 (providing no opportunity to view the
code used to create the 3D-printed object).
295. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 5 (explaining that code can infringe on a
copyright not only through the “words” that the programmer chooses to use “but
also [through] what is called ‘non-literal infringement’—the taking of the
essence of the author’s expression without using the author’s actual words”).
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filtration–comparison test applies to CAD file code),296 but it
cannot provide a bright-line rule. The code portion of a CAD file
differentiates it from other computer-generated works, and the
fact that the code is a literary work, along with the amount of the
code affected by the design, distinguishes it from audiovisual
program outputs.
f. CAD Files Lack a Comprehensive Analog
Although each of the potential analogs noted above touch on
one aspect of CAD files, none provides a completely translatable
test for copyrightability. CAD files are different because they
combine (1) a technical drawing297 with (2) computer code,298 and
(3) they serve a distinct purpose: they send information to a 3D
printer to create a 3D object.299 Therefore, any test for the
copyrightability of CAD files will have to draw on aspects from
many of the potential analogs to address these three components.
2. A Composite Test for Copyrightability of CAD Files
When courts have not been able to find perfect analogs in
particularly complex cases, they have developed composite tests
to determine copyrightability. In 1930, Judge Hand examined the
copyrightability of both the plot and characters of the plaintiff’s
play to determine whether the defendant’s film infringed in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.300 More recently, courts have
296. See supra Part VI.A.1.d (raising the question of whether software
presents an appropriate analog given the possibility that one must attribute the
code to the software programmer and not the CAD designer).
297. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (describing CAD files as
blueprints).
298. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (explaining how CAD
files contain a computer code component).
299. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (describing how CAD
files turn a virtual design into a 3D-printed object).
300. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“But we do not doubt that two plays
may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement. . . . Nor need we hold
that the same may not be true as to the characters, quite independently of the
‘plot’ proper . . . .”).
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resorted to composite tests when the work in question does not
fall within a category explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act.
For example, the Second Circuit addressed other circuits’
struggles to formulate a test for the copyrightability of computer
software301 by developing the abstraction–filtration–comparison
test, which directs courts to ascertain the copyrightability of each
relevant portion of the work.302 In a similar manner, the Ninth
Circuit examined each of the different components of the Duke
Nukem 3D video game in Micro Star to determine which
components contained copyrighted artwork.303 It is appropriate,
then, to formulate a test to determine the copyrightability of CAD
files that examines independently their different components.
First, this test will ascertain the copyrightability of the design
drawing component under the same rules as a technical drawing.
Second, the test will determine whether the computer code
component is copyrightable by inquiring into the authorship of
the code and by applying the abstraction–filtration–comparison
test. Finally, in cases in which the design drawing is
copyrightable but the code is not, the test will inquire whether
the expression of the former has merged with the idea embodied
in the latter.
a. Determine the Copyrightability of the Design Drawing
Because it is analogous to a technical drawing,304 the design
drawing component of a CAD file will be copyrightable under the
301. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (determining that anything not necessary to the
purpose of the work is copyrightable expression); Synercom Tech. v. Univ.
Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013–14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (concluding that
sequencing and ordering of a program is never copyrightable expression).
302. See supra notes 269–76 and accompanying text (explaining the test
from Altai in detail).
303. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“The game consists of three separate components: the game engine, the source
art library and the MAP files . . . The MAP file describes the level in painstaking
detail, but it does not actually contain any of the copyrighted art itself . . . .”).
304. See supra Part VI.A.1.b (developing the analogy between technical
drawings and the design drawing component of a CAD file).
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same rules as any pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work.305
Under § 102(a) of the Copyright Act, “pictorial, graphical, and
sculptural works” constitute a “work of authorship,” which to be
copyrightable must be “original” and “fixed in any tangible
medium.”306 Section 102(a) goes on to further explain the fixation
requirement by stating that the tangible medium must be such
that the work “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”307 As a digital file, a CAD file is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression; it can be perceived, reproduced, and
communicated
using
a
computer.308
Therefore,
the
copyrightability of a CAD file’s design drawing component rests
on its originality.
Original works of authorship require “independent creation”
and “a modicum of creativity.”309 Because the creativity threshold
is low,310 the drawing component of any CAD file depicting a
305. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Graphic works, including technical
drawings, are among the works that are eligible for copyright protection.” (citing
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012))).
306. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing further that the medium can be
“now known or later developed”).
307. Id.
308. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996)
(determining that the plaintiff’s computer files, which were saved on CD-ROMs,
were fixed in a tangible medium); Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer
Security Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability, and the First
Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71, 120 (2002) (“Many works, such as texts,
drawings, or other files that are produced by humans and saved as files onto
computer systems, qualify for copyright.”); cf. Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who
Owns the Copyright to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine’s
Applicability to Internet Resources Created for Distance Learning and
Traditional Classroom Courses, 41 B.C. L. REV. 549, 563 (2000) (“Such [website]
files are fixed in a ‘tangible medium of expression,’ namely an Internet server’s
hard drive, ‘from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated . . . with the aid of a machine o[r] device,’ that is, by retrieval of a
copy of the computer file or files.”); Jeremiah A. Armstrong, Comment, The
Digital Era of Photography Requires Streamlined Licensing and Rights
Management, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 785, 787 (2007) (“Therefore, a
photographic image is fixed whether the media is film, negative, print, or
computer-readable digital file.”).
309. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
310. See id. at 345 (positing that almost any work possesses “some creative
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wholly novel—and therefore necessarily independently created—
design would be copyrightable.311 Originality, then, potentially
poses problems only for 3D-scanned designs312 and user-rendered
designs of preexisting works.313 Insofar as “a work may be
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as
the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying,”314 a 3Dscanned CAD file fails to meet the independent creation criterion
for originality because the 3D scanner literally copies the work by
measuring its exact dimensions and creating a virtual model.315
For similar reasons, a user-created CAD drawing that depicts a
previously existing copyrighted work will not meet the originality
requirement if it “present[s] in substantial and sufficient degree”
spark”).
311. Compare Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879–80 (9th Cir.
1992) (concluding that the plaintiff’s floor plans satisfied the originality
requirement and were therefore copyrightable), with How to Create Your Own
Custom 3D Printed iPhone Case, INSTRUCTABLES, http://www.instructables.com/
id/How-to-create-your-own-3D-Printed-iPhone-Case-from/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2014) [hereinafter How to Create] (including a sample CAD drawing with twodimensional front, back, and side views) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The two dimensional portion of the CAD drawing is the bare
minimum. Unlike floor plans, CAD drawings generally are elaborate virtual 3D
models. See, e.g., The Wired 3D Print-off, supra note 26 (providing examples of
3D-rendered CAD files).
312. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining how a CAD file
can comprise images scanned from a 3D scanner); infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing
whether 3D-scanned CAD files are independently copyrightable derivative
works).
313. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (describing CAD files that depict Iron
Man and characters from Star Wars); infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing whether 3Dscanned CAD files are independently copyrightable derivative works).
314. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
315. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258,
1266–68 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining that Meshwerks’s virtual models of
Toyota cars failed the originality requirement and were therefore not
copyrightable because “the end-results were unadorned images of Toyota’s
vehicles, the appearances of which do not owe their origins to Meshwerks”); cf.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 142, § 2.08[E][2] (“[A] photograph of a
photograph or other printed matter [is not original if it] amounts to nothing
more than a slavish copying.”). But see SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc.,
117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (determining that the plaintiff’s
photographs of the defendant’s picture frames did meet the originality
requirement because of the plaintiff’s creative process and exercise of
“significant aesthetic judgment” in composing the photos).
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a copyrighted work.316 Only if the prior work is in the public
domain (absent a fair use defense) could a CAD drawing
depicting that work be copyrightable.317 Finally, an adept
programmer could conceivably write code for a 3D-printable
object without creating a design drawing. In such a case, there
would obviously be no copyrightable drawing component of the
CAD file.
Insofar as the drawing component of a CAD file depicting an
original design would be copyrightable as a technical drawing,
the copyright protection in the drawing component would extend
only to the drawing itself.318 Unlike copyrights in architectural
plans, copyrights in other technical drawings do not afford
protection to the work that the drawing depicts.319 Copyrightable
CAD drawings’ protection might, however, extend to 3D-printed
objects as derivative works.320

b. Determine the Copyrightability of the Code Component
Determining the copyrightability of a CAD file’s code
component consists of two inquiries. First, one must determine
whether the code is attributable to the CAD designer.321 Second,
316. Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 224 (E.D.N.Y.
1963).
317. See id. (“[I]t is . . . originality which entitles plaintiff . . . in the . . .
presentation of material whether new or old. As to what is old, only the common
source, not the copyrighted work, except as to fair use, may be resorted to by all,
for only the old lies in the public domain.”).
318. Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (allowing a pleading that asserted that “the
Plaintiff’s copyright protects the design drawing from being copied . . . [and]
claim[ed] for copyright infringement as to the copies (as distinct from the actual
trailer)”).
319. See Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434–36 (S.D.
W. Va. 2003) (refusing to extend protection in a technical drawing of a medicine
cabinet to the physical cabinets because of the useful article doctrine, despite
the AWCPA’s extension of similar protection to architectural works).
320. See infra Part VI.B.2 (discussing whether 3D-printed objects are
protectable as derivative works of the CAD files from which they were printed).
321. See supra Part VI.A.1.d (explaining how the code component of a CAD
file might be attributable to the software programmer instead of the CAD
designer).
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one must determine whether the code itself is copyrightable
under the filtration portion of the abstraction–filtration–
comparison test.322
CAD files present a unique question of authorship because,
unlike other computer-generated works in which any code only
contributes to the creation of the work itself, an integral
component of the CAD file itself is the code that allows it to print
a 3D object.323 The code component of a CAD file seems to fall
somewhere in between computer-generated works such as
Microsoft Word documents, for which the copyright holder is
clearly the user of the program, and video game outputs, which
the courts have found to be the work of the programmer.324 In a
1986 article, Professor Pamela Samuelson posited that the
copyrights in computer-generated works would be attributable to
programs themselves rather than the users if and only if
“computer-generated works incorporate recognizable blocks of
expression from the underlying programs, and do so in a manner
that cannot be a fair use of the underlying program.”325 Applying
Samuelson’s rule to 3D printing, the code component of a CAD
file would be attributable to the user unless the code in the CAD
file contained recognizable blocks of code from the program itself.
Whether such blocks are recognizable will depend on the CAD
software itself and how the programmer chose to express the
code.326 If a CAD file was created with surface modeling software
and consists of minimal pieces of code—representing, for
322. See supra notes 271–76 (describing the standards of the filtration
component of the abstraction–filtration–comparison test).
323. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the crucial role of
the code component in a CAD file).
324. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text (detailing the two sides
of this spectrum of authorship).
325. Pamela Samuelson, The Future of Software Protection: Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1215
(1986). Despite positing that a programmer could not claim authorship over a
computer-generated work created with his program only if no fair use could be
asserted by the user, Professor Samuelson doubts whether fair use “would have
any applicability to the computer-generated work problem.” Id. at 1215 n.122.
326. See id. at 1215 (“In general, computer-generated works do not
incorporate recognizable blocks of expression from the underlying
program . . . .”).
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example, individual pixels—arranged in distinct combinations
depending on the user’s manipulations of the software, the code
would likely be attributable to the user.327 If, however, the
programmer expressed code in large chunks corresponding with
premade shapes in a solid modeling program, such code would
likely not be attributable to the user.328 Even if the code does
comprise recognizable building blocks, it may still be attributable
to the user if the employment of those blocks constitutes fair
use.329
If the code component of a CAD file is attributable to the
designer, the courts should apply the filtration portion of the
abstraction–filtration–comparison test from Altai.330 One might
argue that after Lotus, it is inappropriate to use the abstraction–
filtration–comparison test.331 In that case, the court decided not
to apply the abstraction–filtration–comparison test to a “menu
tree” in the plaintiff’s software because “abstracting menu
command hierarchies down to their individual word and menu
levels and then filtering idea from expression at that stage, as
both the Altai and the district court tests require, obscures the
more fundamental question of whether a menu command
327. See 3D for Everyone, SKETCHUP, http://www.sketchup.com/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014) (offering surface modeling CAD software that allows for more
freehand design) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
328. See Tinkercad, supra note 283 (allowing a user to create designs with
pre-rendered shapes). Because solid modeling software arose in the industrial
manufacturing context, and because the useful article doctrine precludes
copyrightability for utilitarian (and, often, industrial) objects, it is noteworthy,
although not legally significant, that CAD files created with solid modeling
software are less likely to be copyrightable. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note
16, at 93 (describing the industrial- and manufacturing-based origins of solid
modeling CAD software). It is likewise noteworthy that CAD files created with
surface modeling software, which “grew up in the midst of animators and
illustrators,” are more likely to be copyrightable. Id. at 94.
329. See Samuelson, supra note 325, at 1215 (arguing that work using
recognizable blocks of a program may be attributable to the user unless he
incorporates them “in a manner that cannot be fair use of the underlying
program”).
330. See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text (describing the
filtration portion of the test).
331. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir.
1995) (determining that the court need not apply the Altai test if the menu tree
at issue was a noncopyrightable method of operation from the start).
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hierarchy can be copyrighted at all.”332 Based on that logic, one
might construe a CAD file’s code to be an integral part of the
noncopyrightable process by which a 3D printer operates.333 But,
as Professor Mark Lemley argues, “[t]his argument seems to
misunderstand the Altai test.”334 Instead of rejecting the
abstraction–filtration–comparison test, the First Circuit was
actually engaging in the test’s abstraction step.335 Because the
question at hand is whether the code—rather than the process—
is copyrightable, it is appropriate to apply the filtration step of
the abstraction–filtration–comparison test.
The filtration step deems “elements dictated by efficiency,”
“elements dictated by external factors,” and “elements taken from
the public domain” to be noncopyrightable.336 Such an inquiry will
depend on the code of a given CAD file created in a given CAD
program, but it is possible to make some general observations.
First, CAD file code is likely to contain elements that are not
dictated by efficiency—those elements than can be expressed in
“most succinct mathematical computation”337—because each CAD
program will likely have its own way of organizing its particular
building blocks of premade code. Second, CAD file code is likely to
encounter problems with the second step of filtration—external
factors—because the building blocks of premade code and the
sequence in which they appear will likely be dictated in part by

332. Id. at 815.
333. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (providing no copyright protection for an
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery”).
334. Lemley, supra note 85, at 21.
335. See id. at 22
[P]roper application of the Altai approach in this context would
identify the menu command hierarchy as the level of abstraction at
which copying was alleged, and would then proceed to decide what if
anything was copyrightable at that level.
Of course, this is in effect precisely what the Lotus court did, although when it
reached the “filtration” step, it determined that the entire program was
unprotectable at the menu command hierarchy level. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
336. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d Cir.
1992); see also supra notes 272–76 (detailing each portion of the filtration step).
337. Altai, 982 F.2d at 708.
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the CAD program itself.338 Even if the user’s actions ultimately
determine the precise combination of building blocks of code
based on his design, the blocks will be arranged according to
directives in the program. Finally, any elements of code not
discarded by any of the three steps of filtration would be
copyrightable.339 Therefore, even if certain elements of a CAD
file’s code might be dictated by efficiency or external factors, or
taken from the public domain, any elements that pass through
the filter are copyrightable. While authorship issues might
preclude copyrightability of code created in certain CAD
programs, and although many elements of a CAD file’s code will
likely be noncopyrightable elements dictated by external factors,
some CAD file code may be copyrightable.
c. Consider Whether the Design Drawing’s Expression Has Merged
with the Idea of the Noncopyrightable Code
Given that CAD files serve a particular purpose—to send
instructions to a 3D printer—it is not enough to merely
determine whether each component of the CAD file is
copyrightable. Instead, one must determine through the useful
article doctrine340 or the merger of idea and expression341 whether
338. See id. at 709–10 (listing as external factors mechanical specifications
of computers, compatibility requirements of other programs, manufacturers’
design standards, demands of the industry being serviced, and widely accepted
programming practices). Although Altai did not expressly list CAD file code’s
dependence on the CAD software, it seems appropriate to infer that the
limitations of the software on the file would constitute “external limitations.”
One reason that the list in Altai does not include this limitation is that Altai
dealt specifically with the copyrightability of the program itself, instead of a file
created with that program. See id. at 698 (describing the computer program at
issue).
339. See id. at 707 (explaining that the filtration step is a method “for
separating protectable expression from non-protectable material”).
340. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates . . . features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.”).
341. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600,
606 (1st Cir. 1988) (“When there is essentially only one way to express an idea,
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the copyrightable elements of the CAD file are negated by its
overall function. The first two steps of this test produce a number
of possible results. Both the design drawing and the entirety of
the code component may be copyrightable.342 In this case, the
CAD file would be protected in both respects because there would
be no component embodying the idea or utility with which the
expression could have merged. It is also possible that neither
component is copyrightable, in which case the CAD file obviously
would not be protected. Additionally, there could be copyrightable
code without a copyrightable drawing.343 If this is the case, then
the third part of the test would be redundant because part of the
filtration step from the Altai test is to conduct a merger
inquiry.344 This final step of the test therefore considers the most
likely scenario: that there is a copyrightable design drawing and
at least some noncopyrightable code. This subsection first
explains why the appropriate inquiry concerns the idea–
expression dichotomy instead of the useful article doctrine. It
then discusses the situations in which a CAD file would either
survive or fail the merger inquiry.

the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying
that expression.”); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would
be the work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of the idea.” (emphasis omitted)).
342. See supra notes 309–17, 336–39, and accompanying text (providing the
standards and analysis for the copyrightability of the design drawing and code
components). Although it is possible, it is highly unlikely that the code aspect of
the CAD file would be copyrightable in its entirety. See supra note 338 and
accompanying text (explaining the problems that CAD file code is likely to
encounter at the “elements dictated by external factors” step of filtration).
343. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (describing how 3Dscanned CAD drawings and CAD designs based on preexisting copyrighted
works would not be copyrightable).
344. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–09 (2d
Cir. 1992) (using a merger inquiry to determine which elements of the program
in question were “dictated by efficiency”).

652

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014)
i. The Useful Article Doctrine Versus the Idea–Expression
Dichotomy

Before applying the third part of the test to CAD files, it is
important to explain why a useful article doctrine inquiry would
be inferior to an idea–expression dichotomy inquiry in
determining whether a CAD file’s function precludes
copyrightability.345 First, § 101 of the Copyright Act excludes
from its definition of “useful articles” those pictorial, graphical,
and sculptural works that “convey information.”346 Because “the
intrinsic purpose of a design drawing is merely to convey
information, the drawing itself is not a useful article under the
Act.”347 Although CAD files differ from other design drawings by
communicating through code to a 3D printer rather than
conveying information to a human being, courts have found that
computer code still conveys information.348
345. But see Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 16–17 (advocating
a useful article “severability” analysis for user-rendered CAD drawings of useful
articles). When Weinberg does consider the doctrine of merger, he does so only
on the level of design drawings without acknowledging CAD files’ code
components. Id. at 15, n.46. Furthermore, Weinberg mentions merger in the
body of the article only in the context of the useful article doctrine. See id. at 14
(“[D]esigns are only protected by copyright to the extent that they go beyond the
utilitarian requirements of designing a useful article.”); id. at 19 (“[A]ctual
copyrightability [for a CAD file of a useful object] will turn on merger
analysis.”).
346. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
347. Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); accord
Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879–80 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The
intrinsic function of an architectural plan is to convey the information necessary
to enable the reader to construct a building.”).
348. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 448 (2d Cir.
2001) (“Instructions such as computer code, which are intended to be executable
by a computer, will often convey information capable of comprehension and
assessment by a human being.”). The question of whether computer code
conveys information has not yet made it to the courts in the copyright context.
Instead, Corley considers the issue in the context of the First Amendment. See
id. at 445 (considering “whether computer code is speech”). The court concluded
that “[c]omputer programs are not exempted from the category of First
Amendment speech simply because their instructions require use of a computer.
A recipe is no less ‘speech’ because it calls for the use of an oven, and a musical
score is no less ‘speech’ because it specifies performance on an electric guitar.”
Id. at 447. Similarly, one can infer that a CAD file, like a technical drawing,
primarily conveys information and is therefore not a useful article under the
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Furthermore, even if CAD files did not fit the “convey
information” exception, their design drawings would be
copyrightable notwithstanding the useful article doctrine if they
were physically or conceptually separable from the code
component.349 As one can discover by conducting a simple Google
Image search for “3D printing CAD file,”350 a CAD file’s drawing
component is physically separable from its functional code
component.351 Although a useful article need be either physically
or conceptually separable,352 CAD drawings would likely be
conceptually separable as well. CAD files would likely pass the
temporal displacement test353 insofar as a CAD drawing of an
artistic object would “engender[] a non-utilitarian concept
without at the same time engendering the concept of a utilitarian
function.”354 Similarly, they would pass the Goldstein test, which
is essentially a mental version of the physical separability test.355
This leaves only Professor Denicola’s test.356
Copyright Act.
349. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he crucial issue in determining their copyrightability is whether
they possess artistic or aesthetic features that are physically or conceptually
separable from their utilitarian dimension.”).
350. See 3D Printing CAD File, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/search?
hl=en&site=imghp&tbm=isch&source=hp&biw=1366&bih=643&q=3d+printing
+cad+file&oq=3d+printing+cad+file&gs_l=img.3..0i24.1387.5471.0.5811.22.21.1.
0.0.0.75.913.21.21.0.ernk_timediscounta..0.0...1.1.3.img.4U-PyPInSPo#imgrc=_
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (containing images of CAD drawings, which one can
save in JPEG format, thereby separating the image from its code component)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
351. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(explaining that to be physically separable, the aesthetic elements must be
“capable of existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article into
which they were incorporated”).
352. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 420 (“The Report states that the article must
contain ‘some element that physically or conceptually, can be identified as
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 941476, at 55 (1976))).
353. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (describing the
temporal displacement test).
354. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423.
355. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (describing Professor
Goldstein’s test).
356. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text (describing Professor
Denicola’s test).
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A CAD file might fail Professor Denicola’s test, which
precludes copyrightability “if design elements reflect a merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations.”357 But because the
utilitarian elements of CAD computer code are its “idea,”358 the
Denicola test in the context of CAD files is essentially the same
as an idea–expression dichotomy merger inquiry.359 Given that
CAD drawings otherwise survive the useful article doctrine, an
idea–expression merger inquiry, which applies not only to useful
articles but to all works,360 would better address the Denicola
test’s concerns.
ii. Applying the Idea–Expression Dichotomy to CAD Files
Whether or not the expression from a CAD drawing will
merge with the idea of its noncopyrightable code will depend on
the drawing itself. The doctrine of merger posits that “‘when
there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and
its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying
that expression.’ Under these circumstances, the expression is
said to have ‘merged’ with the idea itself. . . . [S]uch expression

357. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d
Cir. 1987).
358. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236
(3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work’s idea . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
359. See PATRY, supra note 115, § 3:141 (arguing that the Denicola test
adopted in Brandir “confuses conceptual separability with the idea–expression
doctrine of Section 102(b)”). Compare Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (“[I]f design
elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic
aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as
reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional
influences, conceptual separability exists.”), with Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] court must inquire ‘whether
the use of this particular set of modules is necessary efficiently to implement
that part of the program’s process’ being implemented. If the answer is yes, then
the expression represented by the programmer’s choice . . . has merged with
their underlying idea and is unprotected.”).
360. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) (using the idea–expression
dichotomy to delineate between the realms of copyright and patent law).
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should not be protected.”361 Moreover, expression that is a
“necessary incident” to the idea has merged.362 Because CAD files
function as a set of instructions for 3D printers, that purpose
“would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to
that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea.”363 If the noncopyrightable code embodies the purpose of the
CAD file,364 then the design drawing component of a CAD file will
have merged to the extent that it creates the code used to produce
the 3D-printed object.365 Because CAD software creates the coded
instructions as the user designs the object,366 and because the
software sends the design to the 3D printer in 2D cross-sectional
slices,367 “necessarily incidental” CAD files would be those that
portray the design in two-dimensional cross-sections or in two
dimensions from multiple perspectives.368 Although the
361. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707–08 (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988)).
362. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
363. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236
(3d Cir. 1986).
364. See supra notes 336–39 and accompanying text (discussing how code
could be dictated by efficiency and thus constitute a noncopyrightable idea).
365. Cf. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145
(2d Cir. 1987) (positing that for purposes of the useful article doctrine, the
aesthetic and functional elements have merged when the former were designed
with the latter in mind).
366. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (explaining how the code
portion of the CAD file serves its function in the 3D-printing process).
367. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing how CAD
software deconstructs the image into two-dimensional cross-sections).
368. See, e.g., How to Create, supra note 311 (providing an example of a CAD
file consisting of two-dimensional drawings from multiple angles). Similarly, in
Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, the defendant argued
that the plaintiff’s two-dimensional floor plans of a recreational vehicle failed a
merger inquiry. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC,
753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Thus, protection of a twodimensional drawing in comparative advertising would, the Defendant argues,
lead effectively to according protection to the idea itself.”). The court explained
that the standard for such an inquiry would be “not how many alternative
methods of expression actually exist, but ‘whether other options practically exist
under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 2004)). The court, however,
concluded that the merger question was “not best undertaken in the context of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.
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blueprints in Eales survived the idea–expression dichotomy,
those plans did not include step-by-step instructions and so did
not have to survive a merger inquiry.369 In this way, CAD
drawings are more like recipes, which are copyrightable only if
they contain sufficiently expressive elements.370 In the context of
CAD files, such basic two-dimensional drawings like those in
Eales would not be sufficiently expressive to escape merger.
Likewise, if a user creates a design drawing mainly from prerendered shapes in a solid modeling program,371 then the design
is more likely to be necessarily incidental to the noncopyrightable
code because each shape used will correspond with larger
preprogrammed blocks of code.372 On the other hand, CAD
drawings that depict elaborate freehand 3D models created with
surface modeling software373 will likely survive the merger
inquiry because they include more than the minimum amount of
expression to create the code that a 3D printer will use to produce
a 3D object.374 Ultimately, however, courts will have to determine
369. See Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Eales’ plans laid out the location and sizes of numerous features of model
home #3, and thus her ideas were ‘fixed’ in tangible form. That is all the
copyright code requires. Eales won damages because defendants copied the
plans she drew, not the idea she created.” (citations omitted)).
370. See Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(recognizing the possibility that a recipe could contain elements “sufficiently
expressive to exceed the boundaries of mere fact”).
371. See, e.g., Tinkercad, supra note 283 (allowing users to create CAD
drawings by selecting and manipulating pre-rendered shapes); see also supra
note 41 and accompanying text (explaining solid modeling software).
372. Cf. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir.
1992) (approving the district court’s finding that “this aspect of the [plaintiff’s]
program’s structure was dictated by the nature of other programs with which it
was designed to interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright”). But see
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986) (“Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then
the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is
expression, not idea.”).
373. See The Wired 3D Print-off, supra note 26 (providing examples of
“original, printable” designs for a contest such as “a heart [pendant] created by
365 smaller hearts,” “a three legged robot with a mini cannon,” and “a
Christmas ornament of a snowflake trapped within an intricate hollow star
cage”); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining surface
modeling software).
374. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (“Where there are various means of
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whether a CAD drawing’s expression has merged with the idea of
its noncopyrightable code on a case-by-case basis.375
In the absence of a perfect analog for CAD files, courts will be
left with two options: they might try to pick the analog that
represents the best fit, or they could adopt a special test for CAD
files. While simply choosing an existing analog would necessarily
ignore a critical component of the CAD file,376 the test proposed in
this Note accounts for both the design drawing and computer
code components of a CAD file while ensuring that the design
component will not be copyrightable if it merges with the
noncopyrightable code embodying the CAD file’s purpose as
instructions for a 3D printer.
B. Derivative Works and 3D Printing in Light of the Composite
Test for Copyrightability of CAD Files
Copyright protects the author’s exclusive right not only to
make and distribute copies of his work377 but also to “prepare
derivative works based on the copyrighted work.”378 Furthermore,
derivative works are relevant in copyright infringement cases
because a defendant can assert the fair use defense to otherwise
infringing uses of derivative works as well as uses of the original
copyrighted works.379 Future infringement actions involving 3D
achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not
necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.”).
375. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489
(2d Cir. 1960) (positing that differentiating copyrightable expression from
noncopyrightable idea will “inevitably be ad hoc”).
376. See supra Part VI.A.1.b–d (discussing how using technical drawings as
an analog ignores the function that CAD files serve as a set of instructions but
how using recipes or computer programs as an analog ignores the design
drawing component).
377. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2012) (granting the author of a copyrighted
work the exclusive rights to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . [and]
to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”).
378. Id. § 106(2).
379. See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112–14 (9th Cir.
1998) (analyzing the defendant’s assertion of fair use of the plaintiff’s video
game in the distribution of otherwise infringing derivative works).
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printing will therefore likely involve derivative works. The
inquiry in terms of 3D printing is twofold. First it will be
necessary to determine whether a work might infringe an
author’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works.380 To do so
one must determine whether the new work is transformative of a
preexisting work.381 The preexisting work must be
copyrightable,382 and the new work must only transform the
preexisting work in terms of content.383 Second, it is necessary to
determine in light of the composite test for copyrightability of
CAD files384 whether the various aspects of 3D printing might be
independently protectable derivative works.385 This subpart
examines whether each of the following qualifies as an
independently copyrightable or infringing derivative work: CAD
files as derivatives of copyrightable works; 3D-printed objects as
derivatives of CAD files; and 3D-printed objects as derivatives of
copyrightable works.
1. CAD Files as Derivatives of Preexisting Copyrightable Works
When discussing whether CAD files are derivative works, it
is necessary to separate CAD files into two different categories:
380. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria
for a work that infringes on an author’s derivative work right).
381. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work as a “work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted”).
382. See Ets-Hoken v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Under the Copyright Act, a work is not a ‘derivative work’ unless it is ‘based
upon one or more preexisting works’ and, in order to qualify as a ‘preexisting
work,’ the underlying work must be copyrightable.”).
383. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text (expounding on
Professor Reese’s argument that the transformativeness requirement for
derivative works differs from the transformativeness element of the first fair
use factor).
384. See supra Part VI.A.2 (devising the composite test for copyrightability
of CAD files).
385. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (discussing the how the
requirements for independent copyrightability of derivative works is the same
as those for original works).
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3D-scanned CAD files and user-rendered CAD files based on
preexisting works.386 In both cases, the CAD file must be based on
a preexisting copyrightable work.387 Thus, CAD files depicting the
torso mannequins from Barnhart or the bicycle rack from
Brandir would not be derivative works because the preexisting
works failed useful article analysis.388 Unlike the plaintiff’s
photographs in SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc.,389 3Dscanned CAD files do not “merely depict defendants’ [picture]
frames [without] recast[ing], adapt[ing] or transform[ing] any
authorship that may exist in the frames” because they add
computer code instructions to the 3D model.390 Therefore, 3Dscanned CAD files are sufficiently transformative to infringe on a
preexisting work.391 User-rendered CAD files depicting
preexisting works may be even more transformative in cases in
which they add a new design element to the copyrighted work.392
Because a work need not be independently copyrightable to
386. See supra notes 310–12 and accompanying text (treating separately 3Dscanned and user-rendered CAD files for purposes of copyrightability). This
Note does not discuss CAD files depicting wholly original designs because, as
original designs, they are by definition not based on a preexisting work.
387. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (rehashing the “preexisting
work” requirement).
388. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142,
1148–49 (2d Cir. 1987) (determining that the artistic elements of the bicycle
rack at issue were not conceptually separable from its function); Carol Barnhart,
Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that any
aesthetic elements of the torso mannequins at stake were “inextricably
intertwined” with their utility).
389. 117 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
390. Id. at 306. This Note compares 3D-scanned CAD files to SHL Imaging
in the section on copyrightability, arguing in that section that 3D-scanned files
were mere copies of the objects that they scanned. Supra note 315 and
accompanying text. In that context, however, the question was whether the
design drawing was original as part of the composite test. The code is not
irrelevant to the 3D-scanned CAD file except in that context.
391. See Reese, supra note 131, at 494 (requiring only a transformation of
content to satisfy the transformativeness requirement for derivative works).
392. See, e.g., Hurst, supra note 153 (describing how HBO sent a cease and
desist letter to an individual who designed a CAD file for an iPhone dock
resembling the Iron Throne from the Game of Thrones television series); cf.
Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)
(determining that the defendant’s computer animation of a diver created with
the plaintiff’s photograph infringed on the plaintiff’s derivative work right).
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infringe on an author’s right to prepare derivative works, any
CAD file that satisfies these inquiries and is substantially related
to the underlying work such that the new work would otherwise
infringe on the preexisting work393 would be sufficiently
derivative to infringe on the preexisting work.394
In order to warrant independent copyright protection,
however, a derivative work must meet the same originality
standard as an independently created work.395 Therefore, the
question of whether and to what extent derivative CAD files are
independently copyrightable will depend on whether and to what
extent the CAD file passes the composite test for copyrightability
articulated above.396 Under the Copyright Act, “[t]he subject
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes . . .
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part
of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”397
Thus, a 3D-scanned CAD file that might not be sufficiently
original to gain independent protection as a derivative work in
terms of its design drawing element might still achieve
independent protection regarding its copyrightable code.398
Likewise, a user-rendered derivative CAD file might be
independently copyrightable in terms of its original design
393. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 142, § 3.01 (explaining how a work
will be derivative “only if [the new work] would be considered an infringing
work if the material which it has derived from a preexisting work had been
taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such preexisting work”).
394. See Goldstein, Derivative Rights, supra note 149, at 231 n.75 (“[T]he
Act does not require that the derivative work be protectable for its preparation
to infringe.”).
395. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1266
n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (establishing the same originality standard for derivative
works as that for any copyrightable work).
396. See supra Part VI.A.2 (positing that one can determine the
copyrightability of a CAD file by examining separately the copyrightability of
the design drawing element and the code element, and then analyzing—if
applicable—whether the expression of the design drawing has merged with the
idea of any noncopyrightable code).
397. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
398. See supra note 390 (discussing how 3D-scanned CAD files fail the
originality requirement only in terms of the design drawing element, but are not
necessarily unoriginal regarding their code).
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elements and its code. Where a derivate work is copyrightable,
though, the copyrightability of the derivative works does not alter
the scope or duration of the preexisting copyright; the copied
elements of the derivative works are not protectable.399
2. 3D-Printed Objects as Derivatives of CAD Files
The composite test for copyrightability of CAD files is relevant
in a different way in the context of 3D-printed objects as
derivatives. Insofar as a derivative work must be based on a
preexisting copyrightable work,400 a 3D-printed object will not
infringe on the CAD file designer’s right to prepare derivative
works unless at least some element of the CAD file passes the
composite test for copyrightability.401 Furthermore, the
transformation from two to three dimensions will be sufficient to
constitute an infringing derivative work.402 But courts have limited
the scope of infringing derivative works. Despite plaintiffs holding
valid copyrights on technical drawings, courts have refused to hold
defendants’ medicine cabinets,403 recreational vehicles,404 and car399. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)
The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such
work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope,
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the
preexisting material.
400. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (describing the requirement
that the preexisting work off of which the derivative work is based be
copyrightable).
401. See supra Part VI.A.2 (setting forth the test).
402. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir.
1980) (acknowledging that the plaintiff’s toys of Disney’s two-dimensionally
drawn characters constitute derivative works).
403. See Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435–36 (S.D.
W. Va. 2003) (determining that copyrights in technical drawings of medicine
cabinets did not extend to the cabinets themselves).
404. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (noting that the defendant’s construction of
recreational vehicles based on the plaintiff’s design did not constitute
infringement of the plaintiff’s technical drawings).
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manufacturing machinery405 to infringe on the plaintiffs’ derivative
works rights because “when a plaintiff holds a copyright in a
graphic drawing of a useful article, others are not precluded from
manufacturing and marketing the article itself.”406 The exception
makes sense because if otherwise noncopyrightable useful
articles407 constructed from copyrightable design drawings
infringed on the designer’s right to prepare derivative works, then
the designer could achieve backdoor copyright protection for types
of works that Congress intended to relegate to patent law.408
Whereas a useful article itself is not copyrightable,409 a
manufacturer could—without this rule—create a copyrightable
CAD drawing of the useful article and then acquire protection of
the 3D-printed useful article as a derivative work for a
significantly longer period of time than that granted by patent.410
Thus, in addition to the composite test for copyrightability,
whether a 3D-printed object infringes on a CAD designer’s
405. Niemi v. Am. Axle Mfg. & Holding, Inc., No. 05-74210, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50153, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2006) (“[T]he manufacture of a machine
from a copyrighted technical drawing is clearly not copyright infringement.”).
406. Forest River, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
407. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that a useful article is not
copyrightable unless its design “incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”).
408. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“[T]he Committee is seeking to
draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and
uncopyrighted works of industrial design.”); Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome,
supra note 24 (“This could create a type of quasi-patent system, without the
requirement for novelty or the strictly limited period of protection. Useful
objects could be protected for decades after creation. Mechanical and functional
innovation could be frozen by fears of massive copyright infringement
lawsuits.”).
409. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this
section, shall be [copyright-eligible] only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates [copyrightable] features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.”).
410. Compare id. § 302 (a), (c) (granting copyright protection for the life of
the author plus seventy years or in the case of an anonymous author or a work
for hire, “95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first”), with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
(granting patent protection for a term of twenty years from the date that the
application was filed).
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derivative works right will depend on whether the 3D-printed
object is a useful article.
To warrant independent copyright as a derivative work,
though, a 3D-printed object must still meet the originality
requirement.411 In Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,412 the
Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s wind-up toys of
Disney characters did not represent independently copyrightable
derivative works by rejecting
the
contention
that the
originality
requirement
of
copyrightability can be satisfied by the mere reproduction of a
work of art in a different medium, or by the demonstration of
some “physical” as opposed to “artistic” skill. . . . Thus, the
mere reproduction of the Disney characters in plastic, even
though the adaptation of the preexisting works to this medium
undoubtedly involved some degree of manufacturing skill, does
not constitute originality as this Court has defined the term.413

Under this formulation of originality, no derivative 3D-printed
objects will be independently copyrightable because they will fail
the originality requirement in some way. A 3D-printed object that
is derivative of a 3D-scanned CAD file with no copyrightable code
element will not be copyrightable because the 3D-printed object
will not be based on a preexisting work.414 Furthermore, all 3Dprinted objects will not be independently copyrightable because
insofar as they are based on a virtual drawing, they will
constitute “no distinguishable variation from preexisting works,
nothing recognizably the author’s own.”415 The only exception
would be an instance in which a user programmed copyrightable
coded instructions without using a design drawing.416 In that
411. See supra note 395 and accompanying text (explaining that a derivative
work must meet the standard originality requirement to achieve independent
copyrightability).
412. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
413. Id. at 910 (internal citations omitted).
414. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing how a 3Dscanned CAD file requires a copyrightable code element to be independently
copyrightable).
415. See Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 910.
416. See supra Part VI.A.2.a (advancing the possibility that “a particularly
adept programmer could conceivably write code for a 3D-printable object
without creating a design drawing”).
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case, the derivative 3D-printed object could be independently
copyrightable because the 3D object would be sufficiently original
compared to the code. But these objects would still have to satisfy
the copyrightability requirements for sculptural works.417 3Dprinted objects therefore face more rigorous standards than CAD
files to achieve copyrightability as derivative works.
3. 3D-Printed Objects as Derivatives of Preexisting Copyrighted
Works
The question of whether 3D-printed objects violate the
derivative work right of copyrightable works or are themselves
copyrightable derivative works depends on whether the 3Dprinted object is an exact depiction of the copyrighted work or if it
adds original expression to a portion of the preexisting work. In
the former case, the 3D-printed object cannot be a mere copy to be
sufficiently transformative because there is no transformation in
content.418 Furthermore, to be original and thus independently
copyrightable, the work cannot make a trivial alteration—merely
changing the size of a work while keeping the same dimensions,
for example, is not enough.419
417. See supra note 210–211 and accompanying text (explaining how 3Dprinted objects would fall under the statutory category of “pictorial, graphical,
and sculptural works”).
418. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text (expounding on
Professor Reese’s assertion that transformativeness for derivative works
requires only a transformation of content). From the perspective of
infringement, the distinction between a copy and a derivative work seems
academic—both infringe on the copyright holder’s rights under § 106. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; [and] (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work . . . .”). But original elements of a
derivative work are independently copyrightable. See id. § 103(a) (“The subject
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and
derivative works . . . .”). If the derivative work is copyrightable, then the term of
the copyright would begin at creation of the derivative work instead of the
preexisting work and would therefore be protected for a longer period of time.
See id. § 103(b) (“The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.”).
419. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267
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The analysis of 3D-printed objects as derivative works
becomes more complicated, however, if the CAD file from which a
3D object is printed is an independently copyrightable derivative
work of the preexisting copyrighted work off of which it is based.
The question becomes whether the 3D-printed object infringes on
the derivative rights of the original work, the CAD file, or both.
Judge Posner acknowledged this conceptual nightmare in Pickett
v. Prince,420 tackling the issue of “[w]hether Prince’s guitar is a
copy of his copyrighted symbol or a copy of Pickett’s guitar.”421
His conclusion: this is “not a question that the methods of
litigation can readily answer with confidence.”422 The Nimmers,
however, disagree in their treatise, arguing that “[t]o the extent
that the nature of the underlying work dictates that any slight
change made by one copier must be the same as that made by
another copier, that fact in itself should immunize the second
copier from liability [to the first copier].”423 Under this standard,
the 3D-printed object would infringe only on the derivative works
right associated with the preexisting copyrighted work and not
that of the CAD file because the 3D-printed object would
necessarily be derivative of the same elements as the CAD file.
As illustrated above, the issue of derivative works in the
context of 3D printing, unlike the issue of copyrightability, does
not necessarily require a new legal test. Rather, the difficulty for
courts will be to parse, in light of the copyrightability test for
CAD files, the many different relationships between derivative
n.9 (10th Cir. 2008) (doubting after Feist—which determined that “sweat of the
brow” does not constitute originality—that the Second Circuit’s ruling that a
miniature reproduction of Rodin’s “Hand of God” was sufficiently original
because of the level of skill required to reproduce it (citing Alva Studios, Inc. v.
Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959))). 3D printing presents
opportunities for other similar alterations. For example, one could theoretically
reproduce Rodin’s “Hand of God” in hot pink plastic instead of white marble.
The “mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium,” however, is not
sufficiently original. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d
Cir. 1980) (leaving open, admittedly, the question of whether a change of color is
a mere “trivial variation”).
420. 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000).
421. Id. at 406.
422. Id.
423. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 142, § 3.03[A].
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and underlying works, preexisting copyrightable works, CAD
files, and 3D-printed objects.
C. Whether Current Fair Use Doctrine Applies Adequately to 3D
Printing
Whereas issues of copyrightability and derivative works will
be threshold questions in 3D printing infringement actions, fair
use will be defendants’ primary defense.424 While Congress
intended the four statutory fair use factors to be applied on a
case-by-case basis,425 courts have done so increasingly in a
mechanical fashion.426 Given the complex challenges that 3D
printing poses to copyright, it is necessary to question whether an
entirely ad hoc test applied strictly by the courts can
accommodate 3D printing to produce consistent results that align
with the greater purposes of fair use and copyright law in
general.427 Thus, this subpart first examines 3D printing under
the current fair use doctrine. Next, it considers particularly
pertinent criticisms of the established doctrine leveled by
Professors Barton Beebe and Edward Lee. Finally, it posits that
424. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 551 (“This affirmative defense represents
the most important—and amorphous—limitation on the otherwise
extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners under section 106 of
the Act.”); Hanna, supra note 12 (“[T]hose accused of copyright infringement
have some potent tools of their own, like invoking the DMCA safe harbor, and
the defenses of fair use and innocent infringement.”).
425. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (“The statement of the fair use
doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the
principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situations and
combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the
formulation of exact rules in the statute.”).
426. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 563 (“[Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Harper & Row] arguably set American courts on a course toward a rhetorically
more mechanical treatment of the section 107 inquiry.”); Lee, supra note 7, at
802 (referring to current doctrine as a “straitjacket”).
427. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477
(1984) (noting that copyright protection gives authors incentive to create, but
that “[t]here are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this
monopoly would inhibit the very ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that
copyright is intended to promote” (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); id. at
478 (“The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works to be used for ‘socially
laudable purposes.’”).
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3D printing exemplifies the need for courts to implement
Professor Lee’s separate technological fair use standard.
1. 3D Printing Under the Current Doctrine
Although fair use inquiries are ad hoc,428 an analysis of some
examples of 3D printing under the current doctrine is a helpful
starting point. First, it is safe to say that fair use would not apply
to an infringement suit involving a CAD file depicting a
copyrighted work downloaded in its entirety from a site such as
Thingiverse. Using Napster as a guide, courts would likely find
that under factor one,429 the CAD file was not transformative
because “[c]ourts have been reluctant to find fair use when an
original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium.”430
Courts would likely find the transfer of the work from a two- or
three-dimensional object to a virtual model to be more like a
space-shift (no fair use)431 than a time-shift (fair use).432 While
one might argue that changing an aesthetic work into a virtual
model that serves the explicit function of a 3D-printing blueprint
is transformative,433 courts would likely find that a change from
the aesthetic to the functional—when that function is to make
3D-printed copies of the aesthetic work—would not be a
428. See Lee, supra note 7, at 809 (“This ad hoc approach, while sensitive to
the facts of each case, gives practically no guidance to the public on what
constitutes permissible fair use.”).
429. See supra notes 160–82 and accompanying text (describing the
transformative and commercial–noncommercial elements of the first factor—the
nature and character of the use).
430. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
431. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that “space-shifting” from one format to another is
not fair use because “this is simply another way of saying that the unauthorized
copies are being retransmitted in another medium—an insufficient basis for any
legitimate claim of transformation”).
432. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423
(1984) (determining that a VCR owner’s recording a program to watch at a later
time constitutes fair use).
433. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.
2007) (“Although an image may have been created originally to serve an
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms
the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.”).
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transformative purpose.434 Furthermore, insofar as the Ninth
Circuit defined “commercial use” in Napster to include “repeated
and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works . . . to
save the expense of purchasing authorized copies,”435 an
individual who uploads a CAD file of a copyrighted work to
Thingiverse, even if it is for free,436 is making a commercial use of
the copyright. Concerning the second factor,437 unlike in Napster,
in which the copyrighted works at issue were songs distributed on
CD,438 the works in this hypothetical need not have been
published. But use of a published work is more likely than use of
an unpublished work to be fair use,439 so if anything, the CAD file
in question is less likely to satisfy the second factor. In this case,
the third factor440 weighs against fair use because the potentially
infringing work has copied the copyrighted work in its entirety.441
Finally, the court in Napster agreed with the district court’s
findings that “Napster harms the market [for plaintiffs’ works] in
‘at least’ two ways: it reduces audio CD sales among college
434. Cf. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (determining that a
conversion of music files from CD to MP3 for online storage and download is not
sufficiently transformative for fair use purposes).
435. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
436. See id. (“Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a
commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works,
even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use.”).
437. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text (explaining that the
second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—concerns whether the work
is factual or creative and whether the work was published or unpublished).
438. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir.
2001) (“Plaintiffs are engaged in the commercial recording, distribution and sale
of copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings.”).
439. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Published works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first
appearance of the artist’s expression has already occurred.”).
440. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (describing the third
factor—the amount of the protected work used compared to the protected work
as a whole).
441. See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While ‘wholesale copying does not preclude fair use
per se,’ copying an entire work ‘militates against a finding of fair use.’” (quoting
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir.
1986))); cases cited supra note 315 (averring that 3D-scanned CAD files are
“mere copies” of the underlying work).
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students and it ‘raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market
for the digital downloading of music.’”442 Similarly, a CAD file
exactly depicting a copyrighted work made available on
Thingiverse would likely reduce sales of licensed copies of that
work because people could 3D print versions for free in their own
homes. Moreover, if the author of the copyrighted work wanted to
make available a CAD file version to sell online, the infringing
CAD file would make it more difficult to enter that market.
Because CAD files that depict exact copies of copyrighted works
and are made available for download on Thingiverse fail all four
factors of the inquiry, courts would likely find them not to be fair
use.
More difficult cases would consist of CAD files that allegedly
infringe on copyrighted works’ derivative works rights by altering
the works or using them in remixes to create wholly new
works.443 Although such CAD files would not appropriate the
entire work, a fair use analysis would likely turn on whether
courts found the files’ uses of the underlying works to be
transformative.444 To constitute a transformative purpose,
however, the CAD files would have to do more than merely “pay
homage” to the underlying works; rather, they would have to
serve a transformative purpose nearer to parody.445 Furthermore,

442. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
443. See Michael Weinberg, 3-D Printing Can Turbocharge Mashup Culture,
HUFFPOST TECH (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michaelweinberg/3d-printing-can-turbocharge_b_2578158.html?utm_hp_ref=technology
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Weinberg, Mashup Culture] (“Easy to
use tools like meshmixer allow people to remix things just as easily as they
remix songs or videos.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also, e.g., Hurst, supra note 153 (describing a CAD file for an iPhone dock
designed to look like the Iron Throne from HBO’s Game of Thrones television
series). For discussion of how CAD files that alter the underlying work infringe
on the author’s derivative works right, see supra notes 386–94 and
accompanying text.
444. See infra note 452 and accompanying text (noting through statistics the
importance that the first factor plays in fair use analysis).
445. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 309 (2006) (arguing
that musical mash-ups, fan fiction, and machinima (video clip mash-ups) are not
sufficiently transformative to constitute fair use if they merely “pay homage” to
the original works); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003)
(determining that the defendant’s use of thumbnail versions of the plaintiff’s
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under the fourth factor, copyright owners could assert that the
CAD files infringe on their derivative work rights no matter how
little of the underlying works the CAD files in question use.446
Therefore, even in remix cases, courts may well find under the
current doctrine that CAD files do not constitute fair use.447
Although cases in which 3D printing appropriates a work in
its entirety are clearly not fair use, the established fair use
doctrine presents formidable challenges to potentially infringing
works in less obvious cases. As currently construed, the
definitions of “transformative” and “commercial use” in the first
factor, and the ease with which a work can encroach on derivative
markets in the fourth factor, will likely make findings of fair use
rare in the 3D printing context.
2. Criticisms of the Established Doctrine
As courts have developed the fair use doctrine since its
codification in the Copyright Act of 1976,448 a number of
criticisms have emerged. Two such criticisms seem especially
relevant in the context of 3D printing. First, in 2008, Professor
Barton Beebe conducted an empirical study of all fair use
appellate opinions between 1978—the year the Copyright Act
went into effect—and 2005, which “show[s] that much of our
photographs were sufficiently transformative because they served as indexing
tools for a search engine instead of the aesthetic purpose of the originals).
446. See Lee, supra note 7, at 852 (“The major problem is the so-called
circularity problem: the copyright holder can always claim an economic harm
from an unlicensed use of its work, even in unformed markets or for unforeseen
uses of a work.”); As 3-D Printing Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions
Arise, supra note 39 (describing how one CAD designer has taken a popular
CAD file of a Yoda bust and turned it into a vase—a use that would technically
interfere with potential derivative markets).
447. See Weinberg, Mashup Culture, supra note 443 (“Sometimes, because of
rules such as fair use, the creator [of a mash-up] does not need permission from
the person who owns rights to the source material. Other times, mostly because
the work falls outside of the scope of fair use, the creator does need
permission.”).
448. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 563 (noting that after Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Harper & Row, courts have treated the four factors in § 107 more
mechanically).
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conventional wisdom about our fair use case law, deduced as it
has been from leading cases, is wrong.”449 Second, Professor
Edward Lee argues that courts have been treating cases
involving fair use and technology differently to the extent that
such cases warrant “greater ex ante guidance.”450 Taken together,
these two articles form the basis of this Note’s analysis of fair use
in the 3D printing context.
a. Professor Beebe’s Empirical Study
For his study, Professor Beebe examined a total of 306
opinions to determine “[w]hether these opinions have any
influence on or are representative of the true state of our fair use
doctrine as it is practiced in the courts.”451 Given the data,
Beebe’s criticism focuses primarily on the first and fourth factors,
which correlated with the outcome of the case 81.5% and 83.8% of
the time, respectively.452 Regarding factor one, Beebe argues that
the statutory language, which requires courts to consider “the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes,”453 has had little effect on courts’ application of the

449. Id. at 554.
450. Lee, supra note 7, at 802.
451. Beebe, supra note 154, at 553.
452. Id. at 584. Beebe found that the
outcomes of factors one and four very strongly correlated with the test
outcome and fairly strongly correlated with each other, while the
outcome of factor two correlated weakly, if at all, with the outcome of
the test and with the outcomes of the other factors. Factor three did
better than factor two with respect to the overall test outcome, but
the strength of its correlations with the outcomes of factors one and
four was not impressive.
Id. More specifically, Beebe found that 95.3% of the opinions finding that factor
one disfavored fair use ultimately found no fair use, and 90.2% of the opinions
finding that factor one favored fair use eventually found fair use. Id. at 597. In
terms of the fourth factor, 140 of the 141 opinions that determined that factor
four disfavored fair use found no fair use, and of the 116 opinions that weighed
factor four in favor of fair use, 110 found fair use. Id. at 617.
453. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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factor compared to court-created subfactors.454 For example, even
after the Supreme Court stressed the importance of
transformativeness in Campbell,455 41.2% of the district court
opinions since that decision have failed entirely to refer to it.456
Instead, even though the Supreme Court rejected it in
Campbell,457 courts are still relying on the “Sony presumption.”458
Meanwhile, Beebe asserts that the fourth factor, despite
supposedly being “undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use,”459 is actually “a metafactor under which
courts integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in
doing so, arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth factor, but
of the overall test.”460 Instead of constituting an independent
variable in the inquiry, the fourth factor serves as a forum for
judges to conduct a “two-sided balancing test in which they weigh
the strength of the defendant’s justification for its use, as that
justification has been developed in the first three factors, against
the impact of that use on the incentives of the plaintiff.”461
The data, according to Beebe, show that the leading cases in
fair use jurisprudence are fundamentally flawed. First, the cases
“fail[] to accurately represent the actual state of our fair use
doctrine as that doctrine is applied in the courts.”462 Second, their
“method is flawed as a prescriptive enterprise in that it
454. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 597 (“To determine what motivated
courts to declare that factor one favored or disfavored fair use, we need to look
beneath the statutory language, which appears to have had only limited
influence on the actual application of the factor, and evaluate how judges
considered factor one’s various subfactors.”).
455. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text (describing the
importance that the Court placed on transformativeness in Campbell).
456. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 604 (“At the district court level, 41.2% of
the 119 district court opinions following Campbell failed even to refer to the
doctrine, while 90.2% of the 92 opinions preceding Campbell failed to reference
it . . . .”).
457. See id. at 602 (“This is good evidence of certain courts’ willful—or, at
best, unknowing—use of the Sony presumption notwithstanding Campbell.”).
458. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text (discussing the “Sony
presumption”).
459. Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
460. Beebe, supra note 154, at 617.
461. Id. at 621.
462. Id.
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perpetuates—because it requires—the myth that nonleading
cases follow the leading cases.”463 Finally, “courts tend to apply
the factors mechanically and they sometimes make opportunistic
uses of the conflicting precedent available to them.”464 Beebe
concludes that such inconsistent applications of the doctrine “are
systematic failures that require intervention.”465
b. Professor Lee’s Technological Fair Use
To address courts’ failures to consistently apply the fair use
factors in cases involving technology, Professor Lee advances a
separate test. Lee recognizes that the general case-by-case
application of the four fair use factors “has its merits when fine
tailoring is needed, but it does not preclude the possibility of
identifying certain specific types of fair use.”466 Citing parody and
reverse engineering as examples in which courts have granted
“greater ex ante guidance to the public,”467 Lee argues that a
separate standard468 is necessary in cases in which “the legality of
the unauthorized uses of the copyrighted works decided, for all
intents and purposes, not just the legality of the particular uses
of the copyrighted works, but also the marketability of the
technology itself.”469
Lee models the technological fair use standard off of the four
statutory factors and, accounting for Beebe’s findings that the

463. Id. at 622.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Lee, supra note 7, at 809.
467. Id. at 802.
468. See id. at 810–11
By “technological fair use,” I mean to describe a category of fair use—
like parody fair use—that recurs with certain characteristics in
different cases. In the case of parody fair use, the cases are defined by
the person’s use of a copyrighted work to parody it. In the case of
technological fair use, the use is for a new or value-adding purpose of
creating, operating, or providing an output of a technology or
application.
469. Id. at 808.
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first and fourth factors dominate the inquiry,470 differentiates the
new standard from the established doctrine through these two
factors.471 Lee’s first factor is a four-part inquiry in which courts
should question (1) whether the use of the copyrighted work is
part of a new technology; (2) whether there is a reasonably
perceivable public benefit from the technology; (3) whether the
use is for creating, operating, or providing output of the
technology (with creation weighing heaviest in favor of fair use
and output least); and (4) whether the use is commercial, with
significant weight given to commerciality only if the technology is
offered at a high price.472 The second statutory factor—the nature
of the copyrighted work—has less weight.473 The third factor—as
does its statutory counterpart—asks courts to determine the
amount or substantiality of the portion used relative to the
copyrighted work but does so in light of the creation-operationoutput inquiry in the first factor.474 Finally, the fourth factor
consists of three inquiries: (1) whether the use supersedes the
object of the original copyright as a “market replacement”;
(2) whether the technology at issue could have a positive effect on
the market for the copyrighted work; and (3) whether a finding
against fair use will affect the market for the technology in
question.475 Thus, most significantly, the technological fair use
470. See id. at 835 (“If factor one usually determines or coincides with the
outcome in practice, then it is important to tailor this factor with enough detail
for courts to ask the right questions in technological fair use cases.”); supra Part
VI.C.2.b (detailing Professor Beebe’s findings).
471. See id. (providing a table that lays out each of the factors under
technological fair use, with factor one including a multipart analysis and factor
four accounting for the effect on the market of the technology as well as on
derivatives of the copyrighted work).
472. See id. (listing the factors on the table).
473. See id. at 850 (“If a technology has a transformative or value-adding
purpose, . . . whether the works used are factual or fictional/artistic is a poor
way to determine whether the technological use or technology should be
allowed.”).
474. See id. at 851 (“[F]or technological fair use cases, the amount and
substantiality of the work copied should be analyzed at the stage of use of the
copyrighted work—whether during creation, operation, or output of the
technology, with more leeway offered at the creation and operation stages than
at the output stage.”).
475. See id. at 854 (setting out the subfactors for the fourth factor and
noting that “[a] court should not ignore how a ruling against fair use in a
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standard adds an explicit instruction to consider the public
benefit in the first factor and asks courts to balance the harm to
derivative markets for the copyrighted work against the benefits
to the market for the technology in the fourth factor.
3. 3D Printing Demonstrates the Need for Technological Fair Use
Beebe’s and Lee’s articles demonstrate the ineffectiveness of
current fair use doctrine in the technological setting. As shown
below, the advent of 3D printing only exacerbates this inadequacy
and reinforces the need for a separate technological fair use
standard. Not only do Beebe’s data indicate that current fair use
doctrine was for the most part not developed with technology in
mind476 but 3D printing is a perfect example of a technology for
which the courts should consider the public benefit and expand
their considerations of market effects when rendering a fair use
determination. Finally, 3D printing exemplifies how Lee’s
technological fair use standard poses both a more nuanced and a
more consistent option than the current doctrine.
Although Congress had technological advances in mind when
it crafted § 107 of the Copyright Act,477 the court-developed
doctrine has evolved largely outside the technological context. As
Professor Beebe points out, of the 306 opinions between 1978 and
2005 included in his study, 52.9% involved exclusively nonvirtual
print works.478 Additionally, between 1988 and 2005, only 21.6%
of the opinions in the study concerned computer software works
or the Internet.479 The relatively low number of technologycentered fair use cases supports Professor Lee’s assertion that,
technology case might negatively affect, if not destroy, an emerging market for a
speech technology”).
476. See infra notes 478–81 and accompanying text (explaining how the data
from Beebe’s study indicate that courts did not develop the current fair use
doctrine while contemplating the particular issues posed by 3D printing or other
new technologies).
477. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 559–60 (“[T]he main controversy
surrounding the section’s perambulatory language, if not the fair use section as
a whole, concerned an emergent technology of the time: photocopying.”).
478. Id. at 573.
479. Id.
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especially in the technological context, “the overall number of fair
use cases that provide even a modicum of certainty to the public
with regard to future conduct is miniscule.”480 Another statistic
that is especially relevant in the context of 3D printing: only
15.6% of the opinions in Beebe’s study involved a shift in medium
between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works.481 The dearth
of opinions dealing with shifting media suggests that fair use
doctrine has not been tailored to deal with the complicated
scenarios presented by 3D printing, in which potentially
infringing CAD files turn physical works into virtual models, and
3D printers turn those virtual models into potentially infringing
physical objects. When one considers the small number of
medium-shifting cases along with the small body of fair use case
law concerning computer and Internet technology, it is not
difficult to see how a doctrine that was not supposed to be “frozen
in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change”482 is instead applied too mechanistically483 to adequately
address 3D printing issues.
Professor Lee’s technological fair use standard is necessary
especially in the context of 3D printing because its first factor
requires courts to consider the potential public benefit of the
technology at issue. Courts have long interpreted the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution—“Congress shall have Power . . . To
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
480. Lee, supra note 7, at 802. This is not to say that no seminal fair use
cases have involved technology. Sony, after all, was crucial because it both saved
the fledgling VCR industry and created the “Sony presumption” that a
commercial use was presumptively not fair use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449, 456 (1984) (positing that “[i]f the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose,
such use would presumptively be unfair” but that time-shifting for personal use
constituted fair use).
481. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 573 (“Finally, 84.6% of the opinions
addressed facts in which both parties’ works appeared in the same medium.
Where a shift in medium did occur, the most common was from print to video or
vice versa, which was reported in thirteen (or 4.2%) of the opinions.”).
482. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
483. See Lee, supra note 7, at 802 (discussing how the courts “have
misunderstood this broad authority to fashion and further develop the fair use
doctrine as a straitjacket that permits only very fact-specific decisions applying,
almost by rote, the four statutory fair use factors”).
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limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries”484—to concern
primarily the interests of the public.485 Fair use is one of the ways
that courts have been able to prevent copyright protections from
actually inhibiting its constitutional goals.486 But while courts
have “frequently acknowledged that the section 107 test is
illustrative rather than limitative . . . only 17% of the opinions [in
Beebe’s study] explicitly considered one or more additional
factors, and only 8.8% stated that the additional factor was
relevant to the fair use determination.”487 Thus, most courts will
likely fail to consider 3D printing’s numerous potential public
benefits—including
efficient
and
affordable
home
manufacturing488 and the broad dissemination of original
designs489—thereby leading to fair use determinations
inconsistent with those of courts that do. Without considering
public benefit, courts risk fair use determinations that ultimately
harm the progress of science through overprotection; with a
484. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
485. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“Like less
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social
benefit . . . .”); Sony, 464 U.S. at 429
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
486. See Lee, supra note 7, at 838 (“[T]he fair use doctrine has always had
an overriding goal of serving the public by acting as a First Amendment
safeguard within copyright law and as a doctrine to promote the progress of
science.”).
487. Beebe, supra note 154, at 564.
488. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“Broken dishwasher part? Download the
relevant CAD file and print it out in plastic. While Amazon made trips to the
store seem dated, 3D printing will make ordering (some) things online feel
positively quaint.”); Lee, supra note 7, at 819–20 (discussing how technological
fair use can serve not only to promote the progress of science (the realm of
copyright) but also to promote the progress of the useful arts (the realm of
patent law)).
489. See The Wired 3D Print-Off, supra note 26 (providing a public forum
through a CAD contest for designers to display and share their original designs
with other users).
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novel, emerging technology like 3D printing, the potential danger
of ignoring possible benefits is only magnified.490
Similarly, the importance of Professor Lee’s additions to the
fourth factor is apparent in the context of 3D printing. Rather
than concentrate only on “the extent of market harm caused by
the particular actions of the alleged infringer,”491 the
technological fair use factor also considers “the technology’s
possible positive effects on the potential market for the
copyrighted work”492 and “the effect a finding against fair use
would have on the market for the speech technology in
question.”493 The first additional consideration recognizes that, as
in Sony, the technology at issue might in fact benefit the very
plaintiffs who attack it.494 The second “reminds courts of the need
to avoid allowing copyrights to have a patent-like effect in
controlling technologies.”495 Such considerations are necessary in
a fair use analysis of 3D printing because the effects on the
markets of copyrighted works are still so nebulous.496 While 3D
printing’s effect on the markets could resemble the Ninth
Circuit’s (realized) concerns in Napster,497 it could also spur those
490. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1387 (2004)
(“Economic evidence strongly suggests that those unanticipated future benefits,
or ‘spillover’ effects, often exceed the immediate value of most new
technologies.”).
491. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (articulating
courts’ interpretation of the fourth factor as considering only the negative effects
of the infringing use on the market for the copyrighted work or its derivatives).
492. Lee, supra note 7, at 853.
493. Id. at 854.
494. See id. (“For example, the VCR opened up a new market for television
shows and movies by facilitating a home rental and sale market. The technology
was ‘complementary,’ in economic terms, to the copyrighted works.”).
495. Id.
496. Compare Hanna, supra note 12 (discussing the potential dangers to the
markets of copyrighted works posed by 3D printing), with As 3-D Printing
Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions Arise, supra note 39 (“People
printing out copies of Tintin’s rocket were the company’s mega-fans, he says.
Instead of attacking them, Weinberg adds, the company would have been better
off selling digital designs to print out Tintin himself.”).
497. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Napster harms the market in ‘at least’ two ways: it reduces audio CD sales
among college students and it ‘raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market
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markets by providing another channel through which copyright
holders can disseminate their works.498 Furthermore, although it
is currently impossible to conclusively determine,499 prohibiting
individuals from freely downloading and printing copyrighted 3D
objects might impair the market for home 3D printing. Although
3D printers might still cut production costs for commercial
manufacturers,500 and sites such as Shapeways might still print
and ship individuals’ designs,501 the full potential of 3D printing
to “democratize creation”502 could go unrealized.
This does not mean that all 3D printing cases would pass the
test; “[j]ust as some asserted parody fair uses may go too far and
fall outside the exemption, so too some asserted technological fair
uses may fail to qualify for the exemption.”503 The Thingiverse
hypothetical above,504 for example, would likely not qualify as fair
use under Professor Lee’s standard. The free availability of
verbatim copies of copyrighted works would provide individuals
with an alternative to buying the author’s works and would allow
them to undermine the author’s efforts to market her works
directly to those with 3D printers through her own CAD files.505
This harm to the market of the copyrighted work would likely
for digital downloading of music.’” (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000))).
498. Cf. Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and
Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1888 n.77 (2009) (noting how copyright
holders such as Joss Whedon support noncommercial fan fiction as a way to
ensure that fans will “never be able to shake” their works).
499. See Depoorter, supra note 1, at 1842 (describing how until the effects of
a new technology on the market are known, “both copyright owners and users of
new technologies operate in a vacuum of considerable legal uncertainty”).
500. See Morrison, supra note 14 (explaining how 3D printing has “ramp[ed]
up” manufacturing businesses).
501. See Made in the Future. Made for You, SHAPEWAYS,
http://www.shapeways.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (offering to “[h]ave your
designs delivered to your door”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
502. Hanna, supra note 12.
503. Lee, supra note 7, at 811.
504. See supra notes 428–42 and accompanying text (discussing how such a
use would not qualify for fair use under the established doctrine).
505. Cf. supra note 497 (describing the effects that the Ninth Circuit feared
that peer-to-peer file sharing would have on the music industry).
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still outweigh the public benefits of the technology and the harm
to the 3D printing market absent a finding of fair use. Thus,
courts should adopt the technological fair use standard not
because it guarantees findings of fair use in all cases, but because
it allows courts to reach dispositions that are both consistent and
in accord with the purpose of copyright.
Those gray areas in which findings of fair use would be
unlikely under the current doctrine but more probable under
technological fair use exist mainly in fan works and remixes.
Most of the CAD files available on Thingiverse that reference
copyrighted works are “faithful ‘fan’ copies of recognized
works.”506 However, according to Professor Greg Lastowska, none
of these works are transformative under the first fair use
factor.507 While Professor Lastowska argues that many fan works
and remixes could still qualify for fair use,508 it seems unlikely
that courts would find fair use under the current doctrine when
the works are not transformative and seem to, at least to some
extent, encroach on the potential derivative markets of the
copyrighted work.509 But this is where a technological fair use
test could impact courts’ findings specifically in the context of 3D
printing. While other remixes and fan works might fail to
overcome nontransformativeness and commercial impact, the
public benefit of 3D-printing technology (added in Professor Lee’s
first factor analysis)510 and the danger to the viability of home 3D
printing of a finding of no fair use (added in the Professor Lee’s
506. Greg Lastowska, The Player–Authors Project 61 (Nov. 30, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361758.
507. See id. (“None of the referential works were deemed to be
transformative.”).
508. See id. at 34 (“There have been very few court opinions dealing with the
phenomenon of non-commercial UGC fan works, and it is possible that all of the
works described as “similar” could be protected as fair uses of the referenced
works. However, it is hardly clear that this would be the case.”). Professor
Lastowska’s study focuses on Internet user-generated content (UGC) in general,
but 3D printing is one of the areas that it specifically examines. See id. at 59–62
(focusing on Thingiverse).
509. See supra note 452 and accompanying text (explaining how Professor
Beebe’s study indicated that the first and fourth fair use factors were most
determinative of the court’s decision).
510. Supra note 472 and accompanying text.
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fourth factor analysis)511 could be enough to tip the balance.
Technological fair use is most likely to and should come into play
in the context of 3D printing in the noncommercial fan works of
the hobbyist and in the interest of fostering home 3D printing
technology.
VII. Conclusion
As websites that make CAD files available for downloading
continue to receive DMCA takedown notices, it is only a matter of
time before a copyright holder sues a CAD designer, a website, or
an individual hobbyist for infringement. In its current state,
copyright law will likely struggle to handle claims involving these
new types of works as it did with home video recording, MP3
files, and peer-to-peer file sharing.512 This Note has proposed
potential solutions for these looming problems. First, it has
posited a composite test for the copyrightability of CAD files that
accounts for the functional interaction between their design
drawing and computer code components by addressing each
component separately and conducting a merger inquiry. Next,
this Note has applied the composite test to the complex network
of potentially derivative works in 3D printing. Finally, it has
asserted that courts should adopt Professor Lee’s technological
fair use standard given the problems that 3D printing poses for
the current doctrine. Equipped with such tools, courts will
hopefully establish a copyright jurisprudence for 3D printing that
will both protect the rights of copyright owners and allow the
technology to grow—to “democratize creation”513 rather than
stifle it.

511. Supra note 475 and accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (describing the delay
between the emergence of new technologies and legislation or legal decisions
resolving copyright issues surrounding that new technology).
513. Hanna, supra note 12.

